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Abstract
Between 1976 and 1983, Argentina was governed by a military government that oversaw
both a brutal campaign against communism and a process of neoliberalization. During this
period, the United States provided substantial economic support to Argentina through its
approval of loans that enabled Argentina’s economic transformation. Early on, the United States
was largely apathetic and complacent in regard to Argentina’s Dirty War. During the
administration of Jimmy Carter, the United States attempted to confront the Argentine military
government about its human rights abuses. However, a substantial contingent within the Carter
administration pushed back against this initiative and worked to protect American influence
within Argentina. This led to the human rights initiative to be an institutional failure. Meanwhile,
the neoliberal economic policies of the Argentine military government, which were supported by
the United States, initially provided substantial success for the wealthiest Argentines at the cost
of the lowest classes within Argentina. This economic success was ultimately short lived, and the
Argentine economy was left in a worse state by the time democracy returned in 1983. AmericanArgentine relations during this period left behind a legacy of failure and complacency, if not
apathy, towards human right abuses.
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Introduction
Between the Argentine coup d’etat in 1976 and the elections of 1983, the Proceso or
military dictatorship of Argentina engaged in both a brutal campaign of subversion known as the
Dirty War and a process of economic liberalization. The United States encouraged the Argentine
junta under General Jorge Rafael Videla to pursue both practices in various ways including by
lending billions of dollars to the new Argentine government through US and international
financial organizations. Meanwhile, the Proceso appealed to American interests by appointing
American-educated neoliberals to prominent economic positions. These neoliberals oversaw a
transformation of the Argentine economic system that gained support from Ford administration
officials such as Henry Kissinger. This support drew criticism from American politicians who
were becoming increasingly active in promoting a human right based foreign policy.
After the election of Jimmy Carter, human rights became a main focus in AmericanArgentine relations. When Amnesty International began urgently reporting the human rights
abuses of the Dirty War to the public, Carter sent Patricia Derian to assess the human rights
situation. Derian’s visit was a major step as she exposed the extent of abuses; particularly, she
revealed that the victims of the Dirty War went beyond leftist guerillas. Derian’s report pushed
the Carter administration to introduce restrictions on trade and military aid to encourage change
on human rights. However, many in the US government worked against this and lobbied for
exemptions for various agencies and encouraged a release of military aid. Human rights agencies
reported a decrease in abuses, but it is unclear if this was a product of American intervention as
the junta was trying to clean its image up for both the 1978 World Cup tournament and the 1979
visit of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The twilight of the Carter
administration saw the United States embrace the junta again for a variety of reasons. This
rejuvenation of Argentine-American relations was also surprising as Videla, who was seen as a
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moderate and favored by the United States, was deposed and Roberto Eduardo Viola became
president of Argentina.
The Reagan administration further embraced the Argentine junta as it revived the realist
ideology that had dominated American foreign policy prior to Carter’s more idealistic approach.
The neoliberal economic policies of the Videla regime triggered a financial recession in
Argentina that encouraged Viola to abandon these ideologies. However, Viola was replaced
several months into Reagan’s presidency. His replacement, General Leopoldo Galtieri, appointed
a new finance minister that reintroduced austerity measures and appealed to the Reagan
administration’s support for neoliberal economic policy. The invasion of the Falklands and
subsequent conflict with the United Kingdom brought about the collapse of the Proceso and the
advent of democratization. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration began introducing neoliberal
economic policies in the United States as well as formulating the Washington consensus.
Between 1976 and 1983, American-Argentine relations were characterized by consistent
shifts in American policy that ultimately eroded the American capacity to influence change. If
there was a continuity during this period, it was one of both failure and apathy. The United States
was generally apathetic towards Argentina and engaged the Proceso only when it could be used
to expand American influence. The United States endorsed neoliberalism in Argentina because it
allowed foreign capital to expand into Argentina. When neoliberalism benefited only the
wealthiest Argentines, the United States simply did not care and continued to economically
support the military government. When some within the Carter administration pushed for
confrontation, another contingent did everything they could to make sure it was an institutional
failure. Although, the work of Patricia Derian and F. Allen “Tex'' Harris provided protection and
a platform for Argentine activists; these limited successes were accomplished in spite of
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institutional pushback towards the human rights initiative. The embrace of the Proceso of both
the late Jimmy Carter administration and the Ronald Reagan administration further cemented the
American policy of apathy. Finally, when tasked with a choice between siding with Argentina or
the United Kingdom in the Falklands War-- the United States ignored the OAS and backed the
British. It was, then, the defeat in the Falklands and the failures of neoliberalism, and not the
neoliberal reforms themselves, that ultimately brought democracy to Argentina.
Literature Review
In the decades since Argentina’s democratization, scholars have begun building a
narrative on the relationship between the United States and the Proceso. These scholars have
focused mostly on the Cold War’s influence on American support for the Argentine junta. They
have often treated economics as a tertiary concern for the Americans. This designation ignores
the numerous economic connections between the two nations as well as the important effects that
the neoliberalization begun under the junta has had on Argentina and Argentine-American
relations in the period since democratization. Furthermore, the focus on neoliberalism and
economic imperialism allows for a better understanding of the American Cold War ideology as
one concerned with expanding US influence through capitalism rather than democracy.
The most notable scholar of American-Argentine relations is undoubtedly David M. K.
Sheinen. Sheinen has published numerous works exploring the American-Argentine relationship
during the period between the 1976 coup d’etat and the 1983 elections. Sheinin’s entry in The
United States and the Americas series, Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained,
details the relationship between the United States and Argentina during the Proceso’s reign.
However, the scope of Sheinin’s 2006 book limits the space he could devote specifically to the
American relationship with the junta. Despite this, Sheinin was the first historian to create a
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framework for analyzing American relations with the junta. Sheinin described the relationship as
starting strong under Ford, weakening under Carter, and becoming strong again under Reagan.
Sheinin was also one of the first historians to discuss the Carter human rights initiative, where
he, depicts the American embassy’s human rights reporting, the American allegations of antiSemitism related to Jacobo Timmerman’s imprisonment, and the 1979 visit of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.1 Again, Sheinin’s book is too broad of a survey to
provide great detail on these topics thus it does not fully address the intricacies of American
foreign policy. Thus, Sheinin eschews the financial connections between the United States and
Argentina throughout Carter’s human rights initiative. Nor does he address the numerous
exemptions to American restrictions issued by the Carter administration. I hope to expand upon
Sheinin’s work by offering a more critical narrative on American relations with both the Videla
and Viola governments. I will argue that the economic liberalization was the key motivator for
American support, although Sheinin only discusses economics very briefly. In his brief
discussion, Sheinin describes economic liberalization and the massive expansion of foreign debt
as problems yet to fully materialize.2 My focus on economics also allows for a slight criticism of
the idea that support waned during the Carter administration. It is difficult to deny that relations
were strained during this period or that aid, and support was withheld by the United States
government as a part of the human rights program. However, I argue that the decision to exempt

1

David M. K. Sheinin, Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained (Athens:

University of Georgia Press, 2006), 164-173.
2

Sheinin, 163-164.
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lenders from restrictions and to reduce military aid, specifically, was done to preserve American
imperial influence.
Sheinin made a number of other contributions to the historiography of Argentina and
Argentine-American relations during this era. He wrote a chapter on Argentina’s Cold War for
the 2020 collection, Latin America and the Global Cold War. His chapter, “Argentina’s Secret
Cold War: Vigilance, Repression, and Nuclear Independence,” positions Argentine history
within the Cold War context. Within this context, Sheinin notes that the military governments of
Argentina all began a shift away from Peron’s third position to policies more friendly to the
United States.3 The section most relevant to this project comes in his subsection, “With the
United States, but Not for the United States” where Sheinin discusses the intersection between
American and Argentine foreign relations and economics. While this section is not focused on
the 1970s and 1980s, he discusses the nuances of Argentine foreign policy which continued with
the military governments. Most notably, he discusses Argentina’s willingness to break from
American foreign initiatives only when it does not strain the relationship.4 This context is
incredibly important to my project, and Sheinin’s description of the American-Argentine
relationship again is valuable. Although, the why is not fully present. The simple answer of
economic imperialism is not fully developed there. Instead, there is a reliance on the natural
process of Cold War polarization. Another of Sheinin’s works, Consent of the Damned:
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Independence,” in Latin America and the Global Cold War, ed. Thomas Field, Stella Krepp, and
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Ordinary Argentinians in the Dirty War (2012), is very important to this project as it provides a
nuanced discussion of domestic support of the military junta. Most notably, it discusses the
domestic reaction to the Dirty War and the American presence. Furthermore, it introduces an
important argument about American complacency and the effectiveness of American human
rights reporting—while its focus on the domestic sphere leaves ample room for one to develop a
unique response based on American government documents.
Few historians have written as extensively on the Carter administration’s human rights
initiative as William Schmidli has in both his 2011 article, “Institutionalizing Human Rights in
U.S. Foreign Policy: U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1976–1980, and his 2013 book, The Fate of
Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina. The article
focuses specifically on the Carter regime and argues that the Carter regime prioritized human
rights based foreign policy and sought to use American strength to force positive change.5
Similar to Lars Schoults in Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America and
Barbara Keys in “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of Human Rights Diplomacy,” Schmidli
positions Carter’s initiative as the culmination of a movement for human rights over realpolitik.6
This is a trend evident in the research conducted for this project as well. However, Schmidli’s
discussion of Kissinger’s motivation behind support is perhaps too simple. Of course, the Cold

5
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Argentine Relations, 1976–1980,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 2 (2011): 365-366.
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Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1981); Barbara Keys, “Congress, Kissinger, and the Origins of
Human Rights Diplomacy,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 5 (2010): 823–51.
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War context is essential—but stating that Kissinger was merely acting as a cold warrior ignores
the steps that the Argentines took to appeal to American economic interests. Furthermore,
Schmidli takes a more positive view of the human rights initiative’s success than I do. For
example, he cites the Carter administrations decision to halt a limited number of exports in 1978
as an accomplishment of the human rights crusade.7 It obviously was a positive step in the right
direction. However, it does not account for the increase in exports that same year. Furthermore,
the argument of his article and the argument of this article can exist simultaneously. He argues
that the Carter administration prioritized human rights and pioneered foreign policy that
considered human rights. I both cannot deny that and do not want to. However, the human rights
initiative was undermined by both a desire to maintain economic influence in Argentina and by
those loyal to the realist foreign policy ideology—a concession with which Schmidli would
likely agree.
Schmidli slightly remedies this in his Fate of Freedom Elsewhere as he expands his field
of study beyond the Carter administration to discuss American-Argentine relations and human
rights under Ford, Carter, and Reagan. This expansion allows him to develop his theory for
initial American support more, but he still falls back on to the Cold War context. However, he
discusses the introduction of realist American foreign policy as reaching its zenith during the
Nixon and Ford administrations with Henry Kissinger at the helm.8 Despite this, his attention to
economics is minimal as he, again, focuses upon the Cold War context and the junta’s position as
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an anti-Communist government.9 The Cold War context was obviously very important, but
analysis focused on economic imperialism better demonstrates the unique situation in Argentina.
Focusing on the Cold War context portrays Argentina as another Chile and ignores Videla’s
initial push to appeal to American interests. Furthermore, the United States praised the Proceso
for its economic successes rather than the Dirty War. There is no reason to deny the importance
of Schmidli’s work as it was incredibly influential on my study.
Barbara Keys’ study of the relationship between human rights and American foreign
policy overlaps further with the focus of this project within her 2014 book, Reclaiming American
Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s. Keys’ book is a study of a much broader
human rights movement that manifested in the American public and government. Meanwhile, I
focus almost solely on the role of the American government and its policies. Keys also discusses
the characteristic morality behind Carter’s passion for human rights that was rooted in his
religious background. She also discusses Carter’s journey towards embracing a human rights
oriented foreign policy. Keys argues that Carter was initially more conservative than many of his
Democratic colleagues.10 She also discusses Carter’s initial desire to promote human rights
domestically with regards to the Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights, and civil rights.11 Keys
then argues that Carter came to adopt a similar foreign policy doctrine as his colleagues in

9

Schmidli, 8-10.
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 230.
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congress during his presidential campaign.12 The scope of Keys’ book limits the attention that
she can pay to specific instances. This is evident in her brief discussion of American-Argentine
relations. Most notably, she argues that Argentina was considered a human rights success by the
United States due to the Carter administration’s ability to make aid contingent on the Argentine
military government’s compliance with visits from human rights organizations.13 However, she
does not mention the results of those reports or the American response to those reports. In a
larger context, this is a small shortcoming in a brilliant work. However, this shortcoming is
pertinent to my research and disputed within my much more critical assessment of the human
rights initiative in Argentina.
The specifics on Argentina absent in Reclaiming American Virtue are ever present in the
work of Thomas C. Wright, whose research is focused on human rights in Argentina and other
Latin American nations. In State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and
International Human Rights (2007), Wright provides a deep, intricate history of human rights in
Argentina during the Dirty War. Wright’s work then includes a much more detailed discussion of
the domestic push for human rights in Argentina than other works consulted for this project.14 He
also pays attention to the human rights push by the UN, the OAS, and even the American
government to force visits by human rights organizations to Argentina. Similar to other works,

12

Keys, 240.

13

Keys, 262-264.
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he highlights the visit of the IAHRC as a watershed moment.15 However, the focus of Wright’s
work is not on American foreign policy thus it leaves substantial room for development on that
discussion. Another topic that emerges within Wright’s book is the grouping of the Latin
American dictatorships, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, and others, when discussing human
rights abuses. He portrays their collective abuses as a regional crisis of human rights during the
1970s and 1980s.16 It is unsurprising then that James N. Green routinely references Argentina
within We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United
States (2010), his study of human rights in Brazil. Green discusses a grass roots movement
against the human rights abuses in Brazil mobilizing within the United States. That movement
then materialized into congressional, and eventually presidential, support. Brazil could then serve
as a sort of model for grass roots activism in support of victims of Latin American violence.
Green states: “the underlying organizing practices developed by clergy, academics, exiles, and
activists laid out an array of approaches to influencing U.S. policy in Latin America, and those
methods proved extremely fruitful as interests shifted from Brazil to Chile and Argentina…”17
There is also then a developing discourse on the overlap between neoliberalism and
human rights. In his most recent book, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (2018),
Samuel Moyn dedicates an entire chapter to this topic. Moyn discusses the emergence of both
neoliberalism and human rights in the 1970s. He also routinely refers back to Chile as a sort of

15
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case study in the relationship between human rights and neoliberalism. Moyn criticizes earlier
work by Naomi Klein which asserts that neoliberalism and human rights distracted attention
from each other. Moyn discusses how Klein and others argued that many conceptions and
narratives of the Pinochet government focus almost solely on the human rights abuses in Chile,
which allows neoliberalism to exist in the background. This then allows neoliberalism to
“emerge unscathed.”18 Moyn alleges that neoliberalism could theoretically lead to positive
human rights developments. He turns to the example of China where neoliberalization, he
argues, brought millions out of property and provided work.19 While Moyn’s argument is not
incorrect within the Chinese context, the Argentine example did not yield positive results for the
working class in Argentina. Moyn also argues that neoliberalism thrived within democratic
societies within Latin America just as well, if not more, than the economic philosophy thrived in
authoritarian states. Here, Moyn cites Argentina under Carlos Menem as a key example. He
argues that neoliberalization was not fully realized until after democratization in Argentina.20
This assertation is not fully inaccurate as Menem’s economic team was not restrained by the
same spending practices that neoliberal economics were under during the Proceso. The
contention is then that Moyn ignores the early neoliberal policies that were implemented under
the Proceso. Moyn states: “In Argentina, and in the startling post-communist wave in Eastern
Europe, the most troubling relationship between human rights and neoliberalism occurred not

18

Samuel Moyn, Not Enough: Human Rights in an Unequal World (Cambridge: The Belknap
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under dictatorship but in the creation of freer societies.”21 This statement ignores the neoliberal
policies of the military dictatorship in Argentina as well as the relationship between these
neoliberal policies and the human rights abuses of that dictatorship. Moyn’s example of China
and Argentina in the 1990s proves the legitimacy of his brilliant argument. The examples of
Argentina and Chile in the 1970s then provides the exemption to Moyn’s rule. Moyn states then,
“It also made clear that there was not so much collusion of human rights in the ‘disaster
capitalism’ of neoliberalism, but rather that neoliberalism could help human rights attain some of
their most cherished ends.”22 This assertation is, again, not incorrect but also cannot be applied
universally. Moyn also does not then discuss the cover that the economic success of
neoliberalism gave when it came to human rights abuses in Latin America. Neoliberal policies,
not fully defined as neoliberalism at the time, proved to the United States government that Chile
and Argentina were profoundly capitalist nations united in the struggle against communism.
Moyn’s criticisms of Klein’s full scale denunciation of neoliberalism is perhaps
necessary as it gives the discourse a level of nuance. Neoliberalism can bring about some
positive human rights developments. However, Klein is correct in discussing the need to not
separate neoliberalism from its history. In her seminal book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of
Disaster Capitalism (2007), Naomi Klein argues that the first neoliberal states in Latin America
committed human rights abuses in order to implement neoliberal reforms. With specific
reference to Argentina, Klein states: “In Argentina in the seventies, the junta’s ‘disappearance’
of thirty thousand people, most of them leftist activists, was integral to the imposition of the

21
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country’s Chicago School policies, just as terror had been a partner for the same kind of
economic metamorphosis in Chile.”23 The reports by human rights groups such as the IAHRC
and Amnesty International, which are referenced throughout this work, reveal that leftist
intellectuals along with labor leaders were significant targets of violence by the Argentine
military government. In discussion of the 1980s or 1990s, there is room to criticize Klein’s work.
However, her work on the 1970s is correct in the assertation that neoliberalism was implemented
through violence. As this is a work focusing on the 1970s and early 1980s, I am compelled to
agree more with Klein’s criticisms and provide evidence for the connection between
neoliberalism and human rights abuses in Argentina.
Scholars have begun to focus more specifically on neoliberalism and the economic
support that the Proceso received. The most notable contribution was the collection, The
Economic Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship: Outstanding Debts, which focused on both
foreign and domestic economic support for the Junta under Videla and Viola.24 Within this
collection, the chapter with the most relevance to this project is “Foreign Powers, Economic
Support, and Geopolitics” by Jorge E. Taiana, which discusses the emergence of “economic
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diplomacy” under Martínez de Hoz within Argentine foreign relations.25 In this brief chapter,
Taiana discusses how the Argentine junta opened the nation up to American corporations and the
international financial sector—and in return, the junta received support, and American
complacency, for the Dirty War. Taiana also identifies the Carter administration’s desire to use
economic and military aid to force human rights changes. 26 However, the length of Taiana’s
chapter limits its ability to address the nuances of economics and American-Argentine relations.
Another important chapter in this collection is Mariana Heredia’s “Economic Ideas and Power
during the Dictatorship” that discusses the junta’s implementation of neoliberal economic
ideology. This chapter was important for discussing the complicity, or even involvement, of
neoliberal thinkers in both the 1976 coup d’etat and the Dirty War. It acknowledges that these
neoliberal thinkers endorsed the junta specifically for its willingness to liberalize the economy
and defeat the “anti-Western Marxists.” 27 Although again, this chapter is a brief, focused
discussion of the Argentine neoliberal ideology and implementation of neoliberal economic
reforms that leaves ample room for my project to expand upon particularly in relation to the
United States.

25

Jorge E. Taiana, “Foreign Powers, Economic Support, and Geopolitics,” in The Economic

Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship: Outstanding Debts (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2016), 71.
26

Taiana, 68-70.

27

Mariana Heredia, “Economic Ideas and Power during the Dictatorship,” in The Economic

Accomplices to the Argentine Dictatorship: Outstanding Debt (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2016), 58.

15
Scholars have also discussed the relationship between international financial institutions
and the Argentine junta. The most notable of these contributions is The Currency of Confidence:
How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF's Relationship with its Borrowers by Stephen C. Nelson
that explores the relationship between the IMF and the Proceso in his chapter “Argentina and the
IMF in Turbulent Times, 1976–1984.” Nelson argues the IMF was pleased by the Proceso’s
willingness to implement neoliberal economic policies, which led them to enter into new loan
agreements with the junta.28 Nelson’s work is mostly an orthodox analysis of the IMF and
Argentina’s agreements. However, they also briefly address the IMF’s complicity in the Dirty
War through both its willingness to ignore the human rights abuses of the junta and its lobbying
for an exemption of American restrictions.29 Nelson’s research on the IMF’s relationship with
the junta is impeccable, but at times they neglect to fully address the relationship between the
IMF and American foreign policy. For example, Nelson cites Schmidli’s book when discussing
the IMF’s exemption—yet, he neglects to mention Schmidli’s mention of G. Fred Bergsten as
the main lobbyist for the IMF.30 Like previously discussed works, Nelson’s specific discussion
of the junta is limited but valuable. This project will look more critically at this relationship and
the IMF’s support for neoliberal economic policies advantageous to American interests.
The use of the current historiography along with primary source research allows for a
more thorough and pointed discussion on the intersection between economics, human rights, and
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American-Argentine relations during the Proceso. There is not an opportunity to break
completely from the Cold War context as it deeply influenced American-Argentine relations
under Ford, Carter, and Reagan. Cold War strategy deeply influenced the American decision to
back the Proceso. Neoliberalism itself was a product of the Cold War as its architects, such as
Milton Friedman, were deeply influenced by their period and saw it as a conflict between
capitalism and socialism. Friedman and others saw the market freedom that formed the
foundation of neoliberalism as a bulwark against the spread of communism.31 Therefore,
focusing on neoliberalism provides a better understanding of the Cold War context. It also serves
to introduce the trends and issues that defined American foreign policy in Argentina, and Latin
America as a whole, in the era after 1991.
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Chapter 1: The Foundation of American Support under Gerald Ford
When the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (National Reorganization Process)
overthrew the democratically elected Peronist government in Argentina in the March of 1976,
they portrayed themselves as a stabilizing force for the nation. Jorge Rafael Videla and the other
military leaders promised to modernize and revitalize the Argentine economy and control the
widespread political violence. To accomplish these goals, the Proceso adopted neoliberal
economic policies rooted in the economic doctrine of American thinkers. Meanwhile, their desire
to end political violence quickly led to an acceleration of the harsh Dirty War. The United States
understood and acknowledged the backlash that would result from the Argentine campaign
against leftist guerillas. Still, American officials moved past their initial uncertainty and
embraced the Proceso whole heartedly by the summer of 1976. By the winter of that year, the
Argentine foreign minister would be received by President Gerald R. Ford and his Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger to a degree that aggravated developing tensions over the Proceso’s human
rights record. Despite only co-existing for less than a year, American-Argentine relations under
the Ford administration and the Proceso respectively created a base level of support that persisted
until democratization in 1983.
Argentina Prior to the Proceso
To fully understand the situation in 1976, it is perhaps best to go back a decade to 1966
when the Onganía military government came to power. In 1966, issues with inflation and debt
already plagued the Argentine economy. At the same time, political violence from both the right
and the left was beginning to become a regular occurrence—although not at the level that it
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would reach by 1976.1 The goals of both military governments, under both Onganía and the
Proceso, were remarkably similar as they both hoped to use military force to bring order to
Argentina. Given their Cold War mindset, both military governments believed that bringing
order to Argentina would require defeating the perceived threat of a leftist insurgency. Both
governments also hoped to oversee a socioeconomic transformation in Argentina. Guillermo
O’Donnell, a political scientist, described the Onganía government as an “authoritarianbureaucratic state.”2 O’Donnell argues that the military became both professionalized and
modernized during the period between 1955 and 1966 before seizing power—and thus saw
themselves as more capable of solving the economic and social problems that a civilian
government had only allowed to get worse.3 At the same time, Onganía adopted the Doctrine of
National Security pushed by the United States. This doctrine put forth the idea that Latin
American militaries needed to protect their nations from both foreign and domestic threats in
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order to stimulate economic growth and societal development. O’Donnell argues that the military
believed itself to be the best governing body to oversee economic development in Argentina—
but to do so, they would also have to halt political violence or “subversion,”4 Under Onganía,
many of the future Proceso leaders received training in the United States including Videla,
Leopoldo Galtieri, and Roberto Viola; all of whom would eventually serve as the head of the
Argentine military government. Still, Onganía promoted a policy of military co-operation but
limited independence from American military and economic aid.5 This marked a clear difference
between Onganía’s government and the successive Proceso government that depended heavily
on American aid. Despite the military’s best efforts, the reality is that between 1966, when the
Onganía government took power, and 1973, when the first unrestricted elections were held,
political violence had significantly increased. Although there is one key difference between 1966
and 1976 that worked in the Proceso’s favor. By 1976, Peron was dead and his traditional
supporters were divided and at odds with one another. As Ernesto Laclau notes, Peron’s failure
to “hegemonize the totality of his movement” led to the continuation of political violence and
instability and the demand for the military to step in.6
The fracturing of Peronism can be traced to the rise of left-wing guerilla groups, most
notably the Montoneros, who had a further left view of Peronism than Peron himself and his
colleagues. During Peron’s exile in the 1960s and 1970s, Montoneros were able to recruit
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hundreds of thousands of followers. Their rise became an important catalyst in Peron’s return in
1973 as the government of Argentina rationalized that his return would bring a modicum of
peace.7 The Montoneros were initially both extremely loyal to Peron and violent before turning
against him upon his return. The group even kidnapped and murdered former Argentine
President Pedro Eugenio Aramburu in 1970.8 In Peron’s absence, however, the ideology of
Peronism was splitting throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The rise of the student movement and
rejuvenation of labor movements saw many middle-class Argentines beginning to adopt a further
left view of Peronism. The ideology of the Montoneros, in particular, began to become
increasingly anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist.9 During the 1970s, the United States was well
aware of the Montoneros and recognized them as a threat to American interests in Argentina.10
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One scholar stated that "(T)he Montoneros' ideology, in short, resembled that of other
antiimperialist and third-world liberation movements more than right-wing Argentine
nacionalismo.”11 While the Montoneros may initially have not been outwardly communist in
nature—they grew to incorporate further left guerilla groups throughout the late 1960s and early
1970s.12
Peron’s return prompted an intense, violent exchange between the left and right-leaning
Peronists that left 20 people dead.13 Increasing violence disrupted Argentine and American
business interests which only exasperated the country’s economic issues. Both Peron and his
widow/successor’s attempts to crack down on the left only prompted further violence. Other nonPeronist leftist groups soon began attacking US interests including kidnapping an American
businessman in 1974.14 Increased attacks on Americans and American business interests caused
the United States to begin to take a more active interest in Argentina and the Argentine
government. A Department of State document on violence in Argentina from this time period
stated that left-leaning political violence from the Montoneros and others was a direct threat to
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American economic and political interests in Argentina.15 Peron’s death again pushed Argentina
further into collapse as “Peronism without Peron” caused any remaining stability in Argentina to
crumble. When Peron’s widow, Isabel Peron, assumed the presidency in 1974—it became
obvious that the existing Argentine government was ill-equipped to bring order to Argentina.16
The perceived threats against American interests also continued to escalate as the FBI reported
an attempt to kidnap Kissinger and other state officials during a planned, and unsurprisingly
cancelled, trip to Argentina in 1975.17
At the same time, the United States began to document the Argentine government’s
clashes with more profoundly leftist groups such as the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo—
usually referred to as the ERP or the People’s Revolutionary Army in American documentation.
Particularly, the US embassy and other agencies reported to the State Department on the ERP’s
attacks on foreign business interests in Argentina and suspected connections between the ERP
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and the Montoneros.18 While the United States was monitoring this political violence, it also
became familiar with the military’s strict policies toward perceived terrorists—as well as the
right wing political violence of groups such as the AAA, the Argentine Anti-communist
Alliance, which had strong connections to the Argentine government, police, and military.19 This
demonstrates that the United States had a strong understanding that the Argentine military would
likely commit incredible human rights abuses if it gained power. The American Ambassador to
Argentina, Robert Hill, communicated these sentiments directly to the State Department in
August of 1975, when military intervention seemed probable but not definite:
“In event of military coup, which for the near future appears remote, we do not envision
leadership being hostile to US. However, admiration for Chilean model coup widespread
in army and we might, if Argentine military chooses this path, face problems in relations
similar to those we face in Chile.”20

18

Robert Hill to Secretary of State’s Office, Telegram, August 20, 1975, Argentina

Declassification Project, National Archives Online Collection, 1.
https://www.archives.gov/files/argentina/data/docid-32455642.pdf.
19

Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Information Cable: Continued Kidnappings by the

People’s Revolutionary Army,” July 28, 1975, Argentina Declassification Project, National
Archives Online Collection, 1. https://www.archives.gov/files/argentina/data/docid32735775.pdf.
20

Robert C. Hill to Secretary of State Office: “The Future Role of the Armed Forces in

Argentina,” telegram, August 1, 1975, Argentina Declassification Project, National Archives
Online Collection, 3, https://www.archives.gov/files/argentina/data/docid-32455646.pdf.

24
Robert Hill is referring to the human rights situation in Chile that was already becoming a major
international issue by the middle of the 1970s. Later in 1975, the United States would make their
attendance at the 1976 OAS assembly in Santiago contingent on Pinochet’s willingness to allow
an independent investigation into Chile’s human rights issues.21 However, this situation still did
not keep the United States from providing some initial support for the Proceso—even though it is
natural to assume that they would be apprehensive towards the government. The American
government chose to extend their support to the Videla government for a variety of reasons.
Most notable of these being the Videla government’s promise of bringing stability to Argentina,
their staunch anti-Communist views, and eventually their incorporation of neoliberal economic
policies.
America’s Initial Relationship with the Proceso
American intelligence was well aware of Argentina’s issues and understood that Isabel
Peron was unable to bring an end to the violence in Argentina.22 However, there is not sufficient
evidence to argue that the United States directly supported the military coup d’etat in 1976.
Instead, the coup d’etat seemed to present an opportunity to the Americans. When discussing the
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Videla government in March of 1976, Kissinger and others in the American government seemed
cautiously optimistic. The United States understood that the new Argentine government was
hoping for American financial assistance and support.23 However, Kissinger and his associates
also understood that supporting the military government would be controversial in the American
media and elements of the public—as the United States also understood that silencing the
political violence from the left could be extremely violent.24 William D. Rogers, the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, specifically mentioned that the Argentine
government would have to “come down hard” on labor activists as well as leftist guerilla groups,
such as the ERP and Montoneros.25 Despite this, the United States decided to move forward with
a series of investments and loans to show their support for the new government. The reservations
definitely remained but the Videla government showed promise and appealed to the Americans’
goals in Latin America.26
There is a long history of American investment capital being used to spread American
influence in Latin America. The main goal of this investment has been to spread both capitalism
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and a positive opinion of the United States. The Argentines were courting this capital, and the
Videla government greatly needed American support to solidify its power. This is demonstrated
in the junta’s attempts at attracting American support by obtaining the services of an American
public relations firm and American educated technocrats.27 They then catered to American
bankers and business interests with market liberalization. Meanwhile, they also expressed a deep
support for the Cold War ideology of the United States on both the regional and local levels
through their support for Operation Condor, a state-sponsored program of intimidation and terror
aimed at subversives throughout South America, and their own Dirty War.28 Through this
courtship of American support, the Argentine military was essentially molding itself to be the
American ideal of a “third world” authoritarian state.29 When Osita Afoaku discusses the
relationship between the United States and pro-American dictatorships, he mentions a shift
during the post-Cold War era where dictatorships no longer could demonstrate their importance
to Cold War strategy—so they began to implement free market, in other words neoliberal,
economic reforms.30 On a limited basis, the Proceso appears as a bridge between these two eras
as its anti-communism and free market economics appealed to American interests almost
equally. The American decision to use private banks, international financial institutions, and
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limited direct investment allowed the United States to develop both capitalism and American
influence in Argentina, all while showing limited public support for the military junta. Still, the
United States used some traditional “Cold-War” methods to provide support for the Proceso such
as funding for infrastructure projects through the IDB.31
By the summer of 1976, the United States was more willing to, at least privately, express
support of the Argentine government. In a meeting with the Argentine Foreign Minister César
Augusto Guzetti and a number of other Argentine officials, Kissinger emphasized his support for
the Argentine military government by both expressing approval for the Argentine crusade against
communism and stating his intention to attend the 1978 World Cup in Argentina.32 At the same
time, Kissinger acknowledged that supporting the Argentines would mean negative attention in
the United States. Interestingly, the American delegation made mention of the unclear distinction
between “political, criminal, and terrorist activities,” all while voicing their hopes for the
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success of the Argentine dictatorship’s attempt to establish authority.33 A memo of the meeting,
quotes Kissinger as saying:
“(W)e want you to succeed. We do not want to harass you. I will do what I can. Of
course, you understand, that means I will be harassed. But I have discovered that after the
personal abuse reaches a certain level, you become invulnerable.”34
As stated earlier, the American rationale for supporting the Argentine military government was
simple: The Argentine military government was the most likely to bring stability to Argentina
while also serving as an anti-Communist, extremely pro-capitalist ally to the United States.
Kissinger stated this directly by telling the Argentines that the United States would do “what it
can” to assist economically and that a stable Argentina has always been the American goal.35
However, this meeting occurred in Pinochet’s Chile—and Kissinger and his entourage made a
point of mentioning how Chile had become isolated by not handling its human rights issues
quickly.36 This additional mention of Pinochet and the Chilean dictatorship again compounds the
existing American anxiety about backlash in the American media—yet, it also demonstrated
their sympathy towards the military government’s war against communism. Although it likely
did not occur at this meeting—Kissinger signaled that the military government needed to clean
up its political violence problem within a year. This sentiment, however genuine it may have
been, resonated with the Argentine dictatorship as they would express it to later American
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diplomats including Patricia Derian.37 While subverting left wing political violence was the main
discussion at this meeting, Kissinger and his entourage also discussed their willingness to lend
economic support to the Argentines, particularly noting the importance of growing the free
market in Argentina.38
The American support could then be justified further by a visible majority of the
Argentine upper class and economic leadership supporting the Proceso. Days after the coup
d’etat, The New York Times published article about a party held by members of the Argentine
upper class the weekend after the Proceso took power. The article describes a jubilant and
celebratory attitude amongst the apartment full of “young estancieros.” It even features a quote
from a wealthy agriculture contractor waxing: “All my friends are saying the same thing. We
really want to see this government succeed. If these military fellows are as serious as they look,
we’ll get serious also.”39 In Consent of the Damned: Ordinary Argentinians in the Dirty War,
David Sheinin argues that the media turned right after the Proceso rose to power. With the
media’s support, complacency towards the regime emanated throughout much of Argentina’s
middle class as many welcomed the promises of stability and modernity.40 It was more difficult
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for the Proceso to garner support amongst the working class who saw the power of organized
labor diminished almost immediately after the Proceso came to power. Videla responded by
asking for the working class’s cooperation and sacrifice in one of his first addresses to the
nation.41 Just as the Proceso’s economic doctrine appealed to the United States, it appealed to the
Argentine upper classes as neoliberalism promised returns to the highest earners. The decision to
appoint Jose Martínez de Hoz at the head of the economy was another reminder of where the
Proceso’s goals and loyalties lay. Martínez de Hoz was a well-known member of the Argentine
aristocracy that was deeply influenced by the anti-Keynsian and neoliberal thought of Friedrich
von Hayek and others. Martínez de Hoz then implemented neoliberal economic policies that
benefitted the upper classes and opened the door for further American investment. His policies
were not just neoliberal but a sharp right turn to the Peronist economic policies.42
Definition of Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism has become a loaded term with many possible interpretations referring to
both political and economic policies as well as the intersection between the two. The most
fundamental definition of neoliberalism in regard to Argentina, and partially to Latin America at
large, is a series of market-oriented economic policies that prioritize deregulation, market
liberalization, and the abandonment of protectionism and the welfare state. Neoliberalism is then
a return to the laissez-faire economic policies of the late 19th and early 20th century world and a
sharp rejection of both Keynesian economics and protectionism. However, it is also something
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uniquely modern with its support for, and to an extent its dependence on, the globalized
economy.
David Harvey, one of Neoliberalism’s sharpest critics, describes the neoliberal state as a
guarantor and protector of markets and private property. The ideal neoliberal state serves only to
facilitate and support the markets and its interventions are only to ensure the freedom of said
markets.43 Harvey also sees neoliberalism as a political economy that works to ensure basic
human rights through the free market. Harvey states:
“Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”44
The neoliberal political economy was perhaps first implemented in Latin America with Pinochet
in Chile appointing a group of American educated technocrats to his economic policy team. The
connections between Chilean neoliberalism and American foreign policy are twofold. First,
Pinochet came to power in an American-backed coup d’etat against Salvador Allende. Without
Pinochet in power, Chile under Allende would not have neoliberalized as rapidly if at all.
Second, the Chilean economic team was mostly educated at American institutions such as the
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University of Chicago, often under the direction of Milton Friedman, long been heralded as the
American father of neoliberalism.45
It is worth then discussing Friedman’s economic policy in some detail. Along with
supporting the neoliberal state as discussed by Harvey, Friedman proposed the abandonment of
tariffs and other protectionist economic policies. Instead, he proposed the free flow of foreign
products and capital to lower prices and increase foreign investment.46 Just as he preached
international freedom, Friedman supported domestic freedom of the markets. However, he
acknowledged the imperfection of humanity and the need for a limited government to act as an
“umpire.”47 In his seminal work, Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman also discussed the
relationship between capitalism and authoritarianism. This discussion is pertinent as
neoliberalism in Argentina was enacted first by a military dictatorship. Friedman argued that an
authoritarian government that introduces a capitalist economy gives its people more freedom
than a communist or socialist authoritarian state.48 That is not to say that Friedman advocated for
anything except for democracy. Friedman saw himself as an advocate for freedom against
complete totalitarianism and his ideology as that of absolute freedom. Friedman saw freedom as
the most fundamental principle of any moral society. He simply defined freedom through the
lens of capitalism. Friedman was also deeply influenced by the Cold War ideology of his time
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which led him to see communism as the ultimate evil.49 Although he never addressed Argentine
neoliberalization, Friedman supported the economic policies of the Pinochet regime and even
argued that neoliberal economic policies helped to undermine Pinochet.50
Friedman and other neoliberal architects did not address human rights directly. Instead,
they argued for the power of consumer choice and markets to force social change. Still Friedman
developed an argument against the idea of “social responsibility.” In short, Friedman dismissed
the responsibility of businesses or businessmen to act out of concern for charity or human rights.
Instead, Friedman stated that their only responsibility was to deliver profits to their
shareholders.51 Rather, the ideal neoliberal society moves past the need for public spending for
good—because the free market allows people to direct their own money towards personal and
communal gains. As Friedman states: “In a free society, it is hard for "evil" people to do "evil,"
especially since one man's good is another's evil.”52 It then can be rationalized that doing
business with harsh dictatorships such as the Proceso works to deliver a freer society. Thus,
neoliberalization could theoretically become a pathway to democratization. This is
complimented by the Proceso’s own public persona as the stabilizing force in Argentina that
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would modernize the nation before preparing it for re-democratization.53 Neoliberal economics
then became a part of this mission, and it delivered the Proceso’s most visible successes that
convinced the United States and organizations such as the IMF of its potential.
The Implementation of Neoliberal policies
Shortly before Kissinger and his entourage’s meeting with the Argentines in the summer
of 1976, the first group of International Monetary Fund advisors arrived in Buenos Aires. These
advisors had stated the Videla government was embracing a western economic ideology rooted
in the principles of neoliberalism.54The IMF, just like the United States, adopted an opportunistic
view of Argentina as a result of the 1976 coup. The lender saw the military government as more
willing to implement austerity measures and free market-oriented policies than the Peronist
government was or would have been. The IMF saw these measures as necessary in order to
combat the economic issues within Argentina.55 Videla had shown a keen interest in garnering
foreign investment since taking power; he even addressed his desire for their support in his
inaugural address.56 It is not a coincidence that these policies run parallel to the principles of
neoliberalism which were gaining popularity in American economic institutions during the same
period— because, the military government appealed directly to both the IMF and the United
States by appointing American educated economists to high positions within the Argentine
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government.57 This would be one of the radical changes described by the IMF as it was
something that no Argentine government had done before. This neoliberal ideology had been
shaped as a part of a broader process of American economic imperialism as well since the United
States had been issuing scholarships to Latin American economists as a way to spread procapitalist sentiment in the region for decades. The most notable product of these scholarships
was the Chicago Boys that oversaw the neoliberalization of Chile—many of whom had been
educated at the University of Chicago.58 Adolfo Díz, who was appointed as the head of the
Argentine national bank by the Videla government, was also a product of this outlook and shared
an alma matter with the Chicago Boys. Díz was a student of Milton Friedman and Arnold
Harberger, two of the godfathers of neoliberalism.59 Their emphasis on the deregulation of labor
and finance influenced the new free market-oriented economy implemented by the military
government.60 Díz and other Chicago School economists further ingratiated the principles of
neoliberalism into Argentina through the creation of the CEMA, the Centro de Estudios
Macroeconómicos de Argentina. This school in Argentina both introduced a new MBA program
based on the principles of the Chicago School and raised funds for more scholarships for
Argentines to attend the University of Chicago.61 The creation of CEMA helped to ensure that
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the neoliberal principles of the Chicago School remained a central part of Argentine economic
planning for the next few decades.
Again, the economic policy of the Argentine military government appealed both to the
American government and financial sector, who saw the government as willing to transform the
Argentine economy into a more capitalist system. Laurence W. Levine, an American lawyer and
investor who had been conducting business with the Argentine government since the 1950s,
described the junta’s economic goals as welcome and necessary.62 He listed the goals of the
Argentine government as increasing foreign investment, putting an end to state-owned industries,
and lowering tariffs. These economic goals set the foundation for the neoliberalization of
Argentina that, along with the Dirty War, became a defining trend of the junta’s reign. Levine
also describes how Robert Hill, the US Ambassador to Argentina until 1977, initially praised the
work of economics minister José Martínez de Hoz. An economist and banker given
unprecedented control of the Argentine economy by the Videla government, Martínez de Hoz
was the technocrat tasked with restructuring Argentina’s economy in a role similar to that which
the Chicago Boys occupied in Chile.63 He saw the United States as a key partner in Argentina’s
economic transformation as was evidenced by his decision to retain the services of an expensive
American public relations firm.64 Martínez de Hoz, an international power broker, also had
contacts within American financial institutions that helped him to gain influence with the United
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States. Most notably, he had a close relationship with David Rockefeller of the Chase-Manhattan
Bank. Rockefeller was so impressed with the economic programs of Martínez de Hoz that he
stated: “The economic reins of Argentina are undoubtedly in the most rigorous, knowledgeable
and responsible hands that the country has had in many years.”65 The decision to appoint
Martínez de Hoz, Adolfo Díz, and others showed that the Videla government was profoundly
different than the previous Argentine government. These decisions helped to restore confidence
in the Argentine government and economy which led to larger, more long-term loans. For much
of the 1960s and early 1970s, American lending in Argentina had been sparse short-term loans
from private institutions due to the lack of confidence in the Argentine economy.66 Still, Levine
recalled that both he and Robert Hill maintained intense reservations about the new
government’s attitudes toward organized labor and traditional Peronists.67 Levine described their
shared anxiety that the government would alienate large sectors of the Argentine population.
Hill’s reservations are not surprising as he became an ally of the initial efforts of Patricia Derian
later on. Although, he also continued to benefit from neoliberal policies of the junta by serving as
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a chair on one of the banks that emerged after the neoliberalization of the Argentine financial
sector.
In A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Harvey asks the rhetorical question of: “How was
neoliberalization accomplished, and by whom?” He answers that: “The answer in countries such
as Chile and Argentina in the 1970s was as simple as it was swift, brutal, and sure: a military
coup backed by the traditional upper classes (as well as by the US government), followed by the
fierce repression of all solidarities created within the labour and urban social movements which
had so threatened their power.”68 Neither the American government nor the IMF could divorce
Argentine neoliberalization from the Dirty War as the government used both actual violence and
the threat of violence to break up unions and implement austerity measures. American officials
routinely referred to the government’s control of wages and “curtailing” of organized labor.69 At
the same time, Argentine intellectuals behind the domestic push for neoliberalism similarly
understood the Dirty War as being necessary to bring about stability and defeat Marxism.70 The
United States encouraged neoliberalization and thus encouraged the junta’s Dirty War during the
Ford administration. When US officials praised the implementation of neoliberal policies, they
did so with the understanding that it was only made possible through the Dirty War.
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The economic program enacted by Martínez de Hoz, Díz, and others showed initial
promise to both the United States government and western financial institutions such as the IMF.
A State Department intelligence report from September 1976 states that:
“(I)n the six months since the March 24 coup, Argentina’s military junta has achieved
significant successes in reviving the economy and curbing political violence. Attendant
human rights abuses, however, have sparked sharp domestic and foreign criticism.”71
This report goes on to praise the Videla government’s steps towards curbing inflation and
stimulating agricultural exports. Similarly, the report states that loans from American banks and
the IMF allowed Argentina to avoid a serious economic collapse over its existing debt. While
there was praise for this move at the time, the new loans saw Argentina’s debt reach over $8
billion. This was compounded by the over $1 billion added since the coup in March.72 Historian
David Sheinen states over $500 million of these loans came from American banks and financial
institutions.73 This essentially proves that the American plan of using private funds and
international institutions to mediate their direct support of the military government worked.
However, there was still substantial direct aid both economically and militarily—this aid would
eventually be the basis of American pressure on human rights issues during the Carter
Administration. The American praise all centered upon Martínez de Hoz and his economic
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program which the report stated had turned the Argentina economy around. The report, again,
describes the stark contrast between Martínez de Hoz’s economic policies and the traditional
Peronist economic policies.74 Still, the American report did not hold an entirely positive view of
the prospects for the Argentine economy despite its burgeoning neoliberalization. The Americans
noted that Argentina needed to further shrink its state bureaucracy and cut back public programs
further if it wished to succeed—and despite the massive cash influx from foreign lending and
investment, the report still argued that the prospects for private foreign investment would remain
minimal as long as political violence continued. Similarly, the report also stated that Argentina
needed to privatize its state oil holdings to allow for full foreign participation.75 Despite these
issues, the United States benefitted greatly from the economic transformation as Argentine
exports to the United States reached $382.6 million in 1977.76
The Emergence of Human Rights Conflicts
When Jorge Rafael Videla came to power in 1976, he made a point of assuring the people
of Argentina and the international community that the Proceso was concerned with human rights.
Videla was quoted in The New York Times as stating: “For us, respect for human rights is based
not on legal mandates or international declarations but is a result of our profound Christian
convictions on the pre-eminent dignity of man as a fundamental value.”77 The same article
mentions Videla’s desire to avoid facing the same international backlash that Chile was facing.
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Still, the article mentions the arrest of several key union leaders and political opponents of the
Proceso. The New York Times reported these arrests while still stating that “bloodshed is
absent.”78 Despite these assurances, there was significant bloodshed in the Dirty War as early as
1976. The State Department then actively began to dismiss human rights concerns and prioritized
a positive relationship with the Proceso despite the severity of violence associated with the Dirty
War.
The September 1976 report on the Proceso’s first six months describes the Videla
government as making major advancements in their fight against left-wing guerillas; yet the
same report identified human rights as an emerging major issue in Argentine-American
relations.79 This contradiction represents the impossible situation into which the United States
had essentially placed itself. The Americans wanted stability and neoliberalization. However, the
Videla government believed neither could be achieved without the subjugation of the left-wing
guerilla groups and their sympathizers. Furthermore, the report argued that cutting off American
aid may only serve to alienate the Argentine government as direct aid was not essential to the
Argentine government; thus, a direct aid shut off would not necessarily force the Argentines to
fix their human rights issues. However, the belief was that an aid cutoff for human rights
violations could potentially begin an important domino effect and put pressure on private
banks.80 The American concerns were centered around the Argentine government’s complicity
with right wing guerillas such as the AAA and others. These groups were gaining negative
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attention in the United States, Argentina, and abroad for their use of Nazi imagery and their
attacks on Jewish religious sites. However, Videla had publicly made a display against these
groups by shutting down the largest Nazi newspaper in Argentina in September 1976.81 The
report refutes the belief that Videla could be acting as a sort of moral figurehead distanced from
the violence with the hope that he could eventually step forward against it. Instead, the report
acknowledges Videla’s complicity in the right-wing political violence and argues that he seems
uninterested in responding to it.82 The decision to not more strongly condemn anti-Semitic
violence was already becoming a strain on Argentina’s international reputation by September of
1976. In the summer of 1976, the Videla government faced diplomatic strains with the Israelis
over the arrest of several Jewish missionaries. The Pope had also spoke against the Dirty War
after the killings of several members of the Catholic clergy who had ties to leftist guerilla groups.
Meanwhile, the Argentine military were already also beginning to face international backlash for
the Dirty War from European nations such as West Germany.83 Still, American intervention on
human rights never occurred, and the Videla government felt itself to be on good terms with the
United States until Carter came into office the next year.
There were American officials interested in Argentine human rights issues as Congress
had requested a human rights report in 1975 even before the military government took power.84
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However, Kissinger consistently side-stepped human rights concerns and kept the United States
and Argentina friendly. In Kissinger’s ultra-realist view of foreign policy, human rights were
essentially a talking point for the United States to save face on the world stage. He would openly
call for the United States to be an ambassador for human rights within organizations such as the
OAS—before telling Chile, and Argentina, that they needed to do what they had to maintain
control of their nations.85 Kissinger’s view of foreign policy stood in contrast to an emerging
human rights-based foreign policy within Congress. Lars Schoultz, a political scientist who
wrote on American foreign policy in Latin America, stated that: “(T)he liberal Ninety-fourth
Congress demonstrated a greater concern for the international protection of human rights than
any other in United States history, and as a result 1975 and 1976 were the salad years for the
human rights movement in Washington.”86 Kissinger still resisted this initiative as much as he
could in regard to Argentina. Patricia Derian later described Kissinger’s approach on human
rights was waiting for an incident and then publicly scolding the offending nation and moving
on.87 This left individual actors such as Ambassador Hill and James Wilson, Ford’s human rights
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undersecretary, almost powerless on human rights issues.88 Wilson’s position at the head of the
Bureau on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was essentially created by Kissinger in an
attempt to deter congressional action and to have full control over human rights policy.
Unsurprisingly, Wilson almost always met resistance when it came to taking action on human
rights issues.89 Eventually, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs would
become one of the leaders of the human rights initiative in Argentina under Jimmy Carter.
The twilight of the Ford administration saw a further entrenchment of American interests
within Argentina. This was most noticeably highlighted by the Argentine foreign minister César
Augusto Guzzetti’s visit to the United States in October of 1976, when, Guzzetti met with both
Henry Kissinger and President Gerald Ford. The two meetings both breached the topic of the
Dirty War but did not make human rights a priority. Instead, Kissinger again expressed his
understanding of the Argentine situation and his support for the Videla government to finish its
Dirty War—and to finish it quickly. Gerald Ford, on the other hand, had a more complicated
opinion of the political violence in Argentina. David Sheinen argues that Ford’s staff
misrepresented the political violence in Argentina within the briefings they presented to Ford.
Instead of being honest about Argentine compliance or collaboration, Ford was instead told that
organizations such as the AAA were acting independently of the Argentine government.
Furthermore, the briefing presented to Ford blamed leftist guerillas, presumably the Montoneros,
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the ERP, and other groups, for the majority of the political violence in Argentina. This
perspective then influenced Ford to not fully breach the issue of the Dirty War and instead to
focus upon the economic success Argentina experienced under the military government.90
It is no surprise then that Guzzetti returned to Argentina feeling his trip to the United
States was a major success. Guzzetti’s mood came as a surprise to the American embassy in
Buenos Aries. Robert Hill’s described Guzetti’s attitude as:
Guzzetti’s remarks both to me and to the Argentine press since his return are not those of
a man who has been impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as seen from
the US. Both personally and in press accounts of his trip, Guzzetti’s reaction indicates
little reason for concern over the human rights issue.91
Hill, again to his credit, was one of the few within the State Department who felt confrontation
on the human rights issue was necessary. He stated that he felt Guzzetti should have received a
stronger condemnation for Argentina’s human rights issues. Instead, Hill believed that Guzzetti
and the Videla government received something less than a slap on the wrist from the State
Department. For example, Hill described Guzzetti receiving a warning to avoid violence against
Jewish people and international organizations including the Catholic Church.92 Furthermore, Hill
described Guzzetti as having received support from both Kissinger and Vice President
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Rockefeller—who encouraged him to defeat the leftist guerillas quickly, so that the United States
could continue to support Argentina.93 The sentiment behind ending the Dirty War was not only
to curb human rights abuses in Argentina but also to defeat the leftist insurgents in Argentina. At
the same time, pressure was beginning to come from Congress and the UN but nothing that was
not offset by the support of high-ranking state department officials.94
Robert Hill was the most adamant critic of the Proceso’s human rights record, but his
views were immensely complex; and his voice was largely ignored by those at the top of the
State Department. Robert Hill must have realized at this point that there was a schism between
his own concerns and the concerns of other sections of the American government. William
Schmidli describes Hill’s resentment for Kissinger’s dismissal of Argentine human rights abuses
in great detail. In particular, he described Hill’s anger with Kissinger’s comment that he had not
paid attention to what was happening in Argentina in 10 years. Still, Hill represents the paradox
that ultimately doomed human rights intervention in Argentina: his hope for positive human
rights improvements in Argentina was second to his desire to maintain positive relations with the
anti-communist Proceso.95 Schmidli discusses Hill’s conviction that human rights needed to be a
private matter of discussion between the United States and its allies. Still, Hill pushed for
American AID to be withheld to force improvements in human rights. The most notable example
was Hill’s insistence that Kissinger cancel IDB loans until the Proceso agreed to investigations
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into its human rights record. A request that was unsurprisingly ignored by the secretary of
State.96
Conclusion
In March of 1977, a travel reporter for The New York Times wrote an article discussing
the safety and appeal of Argentina for American tourists. The article, published about three
weeks shy of the Proceso’s one year anniversary, argued that the violence in Argentina was
political and unlikely to impact a tourist. It was even portrayed as a sort of exotic quirk rather
than a serious issue. The description of a bomb delaying his airplane was treated as a caviler
inconvenience. The violence from both leftwing guerillas and the government was acknowledged
but not prioritized. Instead, the writer highlighted the beauty and charm of the Plaza de Mayo
and the rowdiness of the soccer culture.97 This kind of indifference within travel reporting was
not a major issue. However, the United States government’s willingness to adopt the same
perspective was. Just as the journalist prioritizes the charm and beauty of Buenos Aires over
violence, large portions of the American government prioritized economic success and
neoliberalization over the human rights abuses of the Dirty War. The atrocities that the military
government and its allies were committing were domestic issues and not pertinent to the
Argentine-American relationship.
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Chapter 2: Jimmy Carter’s Crisis of Confrontation
It is difficult to apply a metaphor to the human rights crusade that many within the Carter
administration, including Jimmy Carter himself at least publicly, supported. It was an uphill
battle against a deeply entrenched precedent that human rights were not compatible with
American economic and strategic interests in Argentina. However, all progress made by human
rights crusaders such as Patricia Derian and F.A “Tex” Harris was met with another mound of
dirt being added to the hill by those within the administration, including those in much more
influential positions, that felt the initiative was idealistic. The lasting human rights victories were
then not systematic changes but ground level actions such as the opening of the American
embassy to the families of the disappeared. Here, the United States sent a lifeline to the working
class of Argentina who suffered most from the Dirty War and benefitted the least from
neoliberalization. Nevertheless, these successes were juxtaposed by the eventual victory of those
against the initiative and renewed embrace of the Proceso Carter administration in its final year.
The Human Rights Hill
The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 would be a major turning point in ArgentineAmerican relations as the Carter administration began to implement human rights based foreign
policy initiatives; the last months of the Ford administration were characterized by increasing
violence, further American-Argentine cooperation, and international confrontation. Weeks after
Ford lost the election, the Argentine government massacred 10 guerillas in a forest outside of La
Plata.1 This massacre did little to deter the guerillas in the region as they almost overthrew the
local government and took over a police station just days later. It was not a coincidence that
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November ended up being one of the bloodier months of 1976. An American report from
halfway through the month warned that more than 70 suspected insurgents had been killed in La
Plata alone.2 The acceleration of violence on both sides demonstrates that there was no end to the
Dirty War in sight despite the best efforts of the Videla government. November 1976 also saw
Argentina face another major international confrontation on its human rights record with the visit
of an Amnesty International coalition which included an American congressman.
The Amnesty International coalition described the Videla government’s cooperation as
less than enthusiastic. The Argentine government made the coalition travel with a large police
escort, members of which routinely interrogated those interviewed by the coalition. Therefore,
the report states that its interviews and investigation were not fully transparent due to widespread
government influence.3 Nevertheless, the report does not portray the human rights situation in
Argentina in a positive light. The investigation found that there were between 5,000 and 6,000
political prisoners in Argentina, and that the vast majority were being held without trial or
official prosecution.4 This number is minimal compared to the number of disappearances which
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the report stated could be conservatively estimated to be at 15,000. The government, of course,
denied these numbers but provided three explanations for the disappearances: the disappeared
person had gone underground to join either ERP or Montoneros, the disappeared person had
emigrated, or the disappeared person died in combat with the military or police. However,
Amnesty International had deep reservations about this explanation as there were numerous
witnesses to the various abductions and kidnappings perpetrated by the government.5 The report
then challenged the Argentine government’s claim of only 1,354 deaths resulting from political
violence in 1976. Amnesty International particularly challenged the Argentine government’s
claim that the majority of deaths resulted from violent combat with the police or military.
Instead, it pointed to numerous massacres and group executions of political prisoners. For
example, the report discussed the exhumation of a mass grave that contained 34 corpses—many
of which had their hands tied behind their backs, had burn marks, or other signs that they were
victims of torture or execution.6 The report listed various other human rights abuses including
the brutal torture methods utilized in the Dirty War or the Videla government’s treatment of
political refugees and other deposed peoples. It then concluded by discussing the future prospects
for human rights in Argentina, a future that did not seem bright if the Argentine government
remained unchecked. The report explicitly stated that:
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“The neglect of human rights in Argentina is all the more alarming in that it has no
foreseeable end. According to provisions in the Constitution, the State of Siege may be
declared only for a specified period 'of time; but no limit has ever been fixed by the
present or the previous government. The citizens of Argentina therefore face an indefinite
period without constitutional guarantees; prisoners in preventive detention face indefinite
incarceration. There is no limit to the duration of the military government, no limit to the
period a prisoner may be held incommunicado and no limit to the time that may elapse
before he is brought to trial.”7
The first line of this statement contradicted the long held American idea that the Dirty War
would eventually be won and the political violence would end as a result. It reflected the reality
that without the Argentine military backtracking their efforts, the Dirty War could be indefinite.
A State Department report in late 1976 described human rights abuses in Argentina as a
significant yet less serious issue than the Amnesty International report had—but also applied a
realist foreign policy perspective to the problem and stated that military and financial aid should
be continued. The New York Times quoted a State Department spokesperson as saying that
continued cooperation would demonstrate “our desire to cooperate militarily with a country
which has 1,000 miles of coastline on the South Atlantic.” Furthermore, they stated that
continued support would serve as a means of maintaining a dialogue with the military
government to presumably curb human rights abuses over time.8 Again, the idea at the time was
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also that military aid to Argentina was not significant enough to make an impact on human rights
issues.9 Ultimately, this would prove to be untrue as military aid had increased significantly
since the Proceso came to power to an amount that would make a definite impact. When the
proverbial hammer finally fell in 1978, Argentina was expecting about $100 million worth of
American military aid—and deals under the Ford administration had given them similar
amounts.10
Even if military aid was not viewed as significant enough to influence real change, there
was an increasing economic relationship between Argentina and the United States that was never
affected by human rights concerns. This was because the economic relationship remained
prosperous and advantageous to the United States—so much so that eventual action on human
rights was designed to preserve American economic influence and it did. Between 1977 and
1980, Argentine exports to the United States almost doubled from $382.6 million to $696
million; while imports experienced similar growth going from $771.7 million to $2.37 billion in
the same time frame.11 This growth in trade was beneficial to the United States and was
compounded by a massive increase in Argentine debts to American and European financial
institutions. Between 1975 and 1980, the Argentine government’s debts to foreign financial
institutions grew by 236 percent to just over $28 Billion. Furthermore, the neoliberal economic
reforms deregulated private lending which led many wealthy Argentines to either move their
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wealth out of the country or take out loans from American banks.12 Perhaps another reason for
American complacency was the support that junta still held with the Argentine upper classes. An
Argentine businessman interviewed by The New York Times stated that the actions of the
government were necessary due to the threat of the Argentine guerillas—and American foreign
policy echoed this sentiment: the guerillas threatened capital and any actions against them were
justified.13
The Ascent up the Human Rights Hill
The prevailing sentiment among nearly every institution of American foreign policy and
finance was that the Dirty War was a domestic issue that would eventually be resolved. The oneyear deadline that many believe Kissinger placed on the Dirty War was yet to come. Public
backlash was mounting as members of Congress and international human rights watch dogs were
calling for intervention, but the Ford administration was unwilling to budge and continued to
praise the economic success of the junta. The human rights push eventually materialized during
the Carter administration but attempts to maintain the American-Argentine economic
relationship minimized its impact. Furthermore, Kissinger and David Rockefeller remained on
the scene as vocal supporters of the Proceso with Kissinger fulfilling his promise to attend the
1978 World Cup. Carter’s election triggered anxiety throughout Latin America as dictatorships
like Argentina, its neighbor, Chile, and Paraguay worried about how their future relationship
with the United States under Jimmy Carter. The precedent that had been established during

12

Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, 462-463.

13

“Human Rights Group Reports on Repression in South America,” New York Times, October

31, 1976.

54
Kissinger’s time within the State Department dominated American media reporting on this
anxiety.14 The New York Times described Carter’s desire to cut aid to nations with poor human
rights records as a reversal of Kissinger’s policy of protecting human rights through “quiet but
forceful diplomacy” that prioritized strategy above ideals.15 The Carter State Department led by
Cyrus Vance was then quoted as saying:
“In view of the widespread nature of human-rights violations in the world…we have
found no distinctions of degree between nations. This fact leads us, therefore, to the
conclusion that neither the United States security interest nor the human-rights cause
would be properly served by the public obloquy and impaired relations with securityassistance recipient countries that would follow the making of inherently subjective
United States Government determinations that ‘gross’ violations do or do not exist or that
a ‘consistent’ pattern of such violations does or does not exist in such countries.”16
This generally ambiguous statement was not a purposeful decision. Although, the mixed
messaging was representative of division within the Carter administration on human rights,
divides attributable to the institutionalization of realist foreign policy that led many to oppose the
human rights initiative.
Patricia Derian, Carter’s highest ranking human rights official, described the mindset of
many American officials as either willfully ignorant regarding the Dirty War or supportive of it.
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She abandoned the traditional view after her first visit to Argentina where she witnessed the
reality of the Dirty War. She described mass surveillance, mass arrests of anyone remotely
connected with an insurgent, and bodies poorly hidden in alleys or on the beaches. For Derian,
the height of the junta’s depravity was the practice of abducting pregnant women or young
women and then placing their children with military families.17 Derian saw some of those hurt or
killed by the Dirty War as victims, or at least as humans deserving of rights— instead of
combatants or terrorists. Her appointment in 1977 was essentially a culmination of the human
rights-based view of foreign policy that had been developing in congress and other areas of
government since the late 1960s. Derian’s view of foreign policy was still seen as idealistic by
those more influenced by either Kissinger’s brand of ultra-realist foreign policy or the prevailing
Cold War mentality. The Cold War mentality saw the campaign of subversion against the
guerillas as the necessary eradication of those opposed to capitalism in Argentina and thus
opposed to American intentions in Argentina. Meanwhile, the realist view of foreign policy saw
the Dirty War as the consolidation of power by a government friendly to the United States and
American capital. This is best personified by Kissinger’s offhand comments comparing the
Argentine to the PLO and similar organizations in his first meeting with the Argentine
delegation.18 Many cold warriors, such as Robert Hill, supported influencing positive human
rights changes in Argentina but felt it should be done privately and carefully to preserve the
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American relationship with the anti-communist Proceso.19 Furthermore, the first stage
neoliberalization implemented by the junta appealed greatly to American interests because it
deregulated the Argentine economy—while still maintaining heavy government spending on
military equipment, public defense projects, and other programs as envisioned by the American
national security doctrine.20 Derian defied this mentality by instead arguing that American
influence should be used to create positive changes on human rights, and she envisioned a
peaceful end to the Dirty War.
Upon returning from her first visit to Argentina, Derian decried the government further
for its human rights abuses. In her notes from this trip, Derian briefly discussed the economic
successes of the Videla government in a tone uncommon to American documents from the time:
“(GOA) has made some important strides in improving the perilous state of the economy,
particularly in its international image. It has done so through a variety of means, but in
part at the expense of low wage employees. They are told to tighten their belts; they have
had to adjust to concretely lower standards of living. And they have acquiesced in the
light of the emergency. They are restive…The labor unions have been purged of those
thought to be terrorists as have the university student population, the armed services, and
all the arms of government…”21
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Derian pointed out that the major flaw prevalent in Argentina’s economic success was its
perpetuation of the same type of class difference that influenced many to join the left-wing
guerillas. Critics of neoliberalism often cite income disparity and growing class indifference as a
foundational effect of neoliberalization; and perhaps the success of neoliberalism’s main
objective of solidifying the power of the upper classes.22 This argument could be applied to
Argentina as impoverished lower classes had fewer resources to devote to fighting the junta.
However, as Derian pointed out, the truth was inverse to this assumption as subjugation of the
lower classes bred more support for the guerillas. Another criticism, which Derian fell short of
fully articulating, was that Argentine neoliberalization would not have been possible without the
police state created by the junta. She described workers being quiet despite their stagnating
wages and decreasing standard of living. However, she failed to address the role that fear of
retaliation for acting against neoliberalization played in ensuring their complacency.
Furthermore, American support for neoliberalization shaped the actions that she was able to take
on human rights.

The Limits of Action
When action on human rights become imminent in 1977, the IMF led a successful
lobbying effort to give themselves an exemption from American restrictions.23 This lobbying
effort was led by Fred Bergsten who was both a free trade proponent and a close Kissinger
associate who served as a member of the National Security Council under both Nixon and Ford.
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Bergsten was then serving as the Assistant Treasury Secretary. Bergsten was not the only one to
win an exemption; Lucy Benson, the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance, also
successfully guaranteed continued limited security assistance from the United States.
Furthermore, the government placed limited restrictions on private corporations and finance
institutions. These groups were also aided by the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation who received very lenient restrictions.24 These exemptions limited the
ability of Derian, the Cristopher Group, and others to actually influence change on human rights
through American foreign policy. These exemptions also kept American finance capital flowing
and kept the Videla government afloat, all while encouraging further market liberalization that
opened the door for more American imports and exports at the cost of the Argentine middle and
working classes.
In 1977, several members of Congress sent the United States State Department a series of
letters pushing for the reduction or halt of military aid to Argentina. One such letter placed the
value of American military aid to Argentina at more than $48 million. They also urged Terrence
Toddman, a high-ranking official in the ARA, and others to consider the message of support that
this aid conveyed.25 Soon after, Derian and Toddman submitted a report on suggested action
regarding human rights in Argentina. The report argued that the United States needed to take
calculated action on human rights and proposed the suspension of military aid. The same report
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noted that the United States needed to do everything it could to maintain its large trade surplus
with Argentina; thus action on human rights was hemmed in by US economic policies.26 This
action was approved with an arms embargo to be implemented in the fall of 1978. However,
there was significant anxiety amongst some that this action would strain Argentine-American
relations. The American Secretary of Defense urged approval of significant military aid on a
limited basis. The Department of Defense argued that a limited release would demonstrate
American support for human rights developments and a continued relationship.27
Still, the State Department communicated that the changes they were seeing in Argentina
did not meet their standards for human rights. Particularly, the State Department focused on the
continued harassment of lawyers, labor union leaders, and other community leaders that
defended the victims of the Dirty War. The State Department also expressed concerns that
Videla’s more hard-line rivals were gaining traction in some regions.28 This prospect was
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addressed in Toddman and Derian’s initial report as a drawback of restricting military aid.29
Here, the reality of the junta was beginning to show itself more fully to the United States as the
promise of stability slipped further away. This was not only because the Argentine society and
economy were entirely dependent upon a police state, but also because Videla’s control of the
country was beginning to falter already.
Meanwhile, the economic picture was beginning to become clearer and less picturesque.
Martínez de Hoz continued to promise further market liberalization in order to procure further
loans from the IMF in 1977, but he failed to produce the results promised. This led not only to
confrontation between the IMF but also a sharp economic decline by 1978.30 The forced
subversion of the Argentine labor movements led to violent confrontations between police and
workers throughout the country as real wages plummeted due to continued inflation.31
The Success of Action
While large structural change was delayed through bureaucracy, the United States
quickly also began to assist the Argentine middle and working classes by turning the American
embassy into a resource for those seeking information on the disappeared. At the same time,
Derian and others became vocal supporters of middle and working-class activist movements such
as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.32 Furthermore, the United States appointed F. Allen “Tex”
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Harris as the main human rights reporter in Argentina, and he quickly began to tell the real story
behind the Dirty War to Washington and the international community. Harris and his colleagues
compiled thousands of testimonies from those related to the disappeared. They also began
challenging the Argentine government’s narrative by actually researching those that were
disappeared or imprisoned.33 During his tenure at this post, Harris revealed that many who were
targeted had limited to no connection to the guerillas. These smaller actions then influenced a
large public backlash to the Videla government’s human rights abuses in Argentina, the United
States, and abroad—which led to support for broader action.
In February of 1978, Andres Oppenheimer, then a young journalist studying in the United
States and today one of the leading journalists in all of Latin America, wrote an article about
Jimmy Carter’s growing popularity in Argentina. Oppenheimer wrote about a rising cult of
Carter in the nation that included framed pictures, Jimmy Carter t-shirts, and a level of popularity
that Oppenheimer argued had not been since John F. Kennedy. Similarly, Oppenheimer
discusses liberal friends of his seeing Carter as a spokesperson for those who had their political
rights stripped by the Proceso. An anonymous leader within the Argentine Jewish community
was quoted as saying: “At the moment, we can’t say there is an anti-Semitic explosion in the
country. But there is something not kosher floating in the air, and Mr. Carter’s speeches can’t do
anything but good.”34 Oppenheimer addresses the inconsistency of Carter’s human rights
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initiative that dominated American media coverage, specifically an inconsistency between
Carter’s willingness to confront the Argentines but not the South Koreans or other similarly
brutal regimes. This would be a mostly private debate that influenced implementation rather than
impression. Oppenheimer concluded his piece by arguing that despite the inconsistency of
Carter’s messaging on a global scale, there was a substantial movement to support him within
Argentina. This popularity pushed many Argentines to become less “anti-yanqui” and have a
more positive view of the United States.35 Despite the human rights initiative’s success in
creating a positive image of the United States in Argentina, privately elements of the Carter
administration remained increasingly divided and worked to find exemptions and opportunities
for the loosening of restrictions.
These divisions were expressed in Harris’s discussion of the resentment that many
American officials had towards the victims of the Dirty War. In an interview, he explained how
many felt that the victims were communists and that the overreaction of the Carter administration
had unnecessarily damaged American-Argentine relations.36 Harris’s interviews also revealed
that he was encouraged to report only good news about the Videla government after the backlash
over human rights materialized into restrictions on military sales and aid. Furthermore, Harris
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claimed his cables forcibly were held back so as not interfere with weapons sales.37 US
Ambassador Raul Castro also held a large degree of disdain for the human rights initiative as
well as for Harris and Derian, as Castro saw it all as an unnecessary impediment in AmericanArgentine relations.
The Kennedy Humphrey Amendment
The work of Derian and Harris as well as the limits on financial and economic aid
attracted a large amount of negative attention amongst those in the Carter administration who felt
the human rights initiative was doing more harm than good. However, more negative attention
was focused upon the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
passed in 1977 and active in October of 1978. The act essentially took the human rights initiative
out of the hands of the Carter administration by increasing restrictions and limiting exemptions.
A State Department paper on the need for action against the Kennedy-Humphrey assessed that:
“This amendment may have outlived any usefulness as Argentina’s human rights record has
improved though there are still problems.”38 The same report then listed a series of options
available to the Carter administration. There was the option to repeal the Kennedy-Humphrey
Amendment, and it was recommended that the United States do so.39 However, the amendment
remained until Ronald Reagan’s administration repealed it as a sign of support for the Proceso in
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1981.40 Among the other options was for Carter to take his own action by signing waivers to
allow military sales and economic aid.41 This was the option that the Carter administration
ultimately decided upon, but before this, the administration worked to continue the AmericanArgentine relationship as it was for as long as possible.
The authorization of military and economic aid as well as military cooperation triggered a
response from a group of human rights-oriented senators. They drafted a letter to Carter voicing
their frustrations about the decision to train Argentine military officers in counter-insurgency
warfare in the United States and the Carter administration’s approval of a $270 million loan for a
hydroelectric plant to be built by an American firm.42 The letter also lambasted the Carter
administration’s willingness to train Argentine military leaders since it was set to become illegal
in October of 1978. “Since no substantial improvements can be demonstrated, we believe it is
highly inappropriate, and possibly a violation of the spirit of the law, to approve training of
officers five days before the cut-off takes effect” they wrote.43 The letter also stressed the large
number of disappeared people who had not yet been discovered and for whom the Proceso had
no answer.44

40

Sheinin, Argentina and the United States: An Alliance Contained, 173-174.

41

“State Department Paper on Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment,” 1.

42

Edward Kennedy, Alan Cranston, and Paul S. Sarbanes to Jimmy Carter, Letter, September 29,

1978, Argentina Declassification Project, National Archives Online Collection, 1.
https://www.archives.gov/files/argentina/data/docid-33065493.pdf.
43

Kennedy, Cranston, and Sarbanes to Carter, 2.

44

Kennedy, Cranston, and Sarbanes to Carter, 1.

65
The United States could hang its hat on a decrease in disappearances by 1978 after the
disappearances had spiked in 1976 and 1977 during the junta’s first few months.45 The Carter
administration often approached the American-Argentine relationship in almost paternalistic
terms. They saw military and economic aid as rewards and punishments for positive and negative
developments in human rights or other American initiatives. However, the Argentine military
government consistently pushed for American recognition for positive changes. This was
because it gave the regime some slack internationally as well as domestically.46 It is interesting
that the Senate letter chose to focus upon the Export-Import Bank loan for a hydroelectric plant
because the Carter administration would eventually tie approval of that loan to the Proceso’s
willingness to allow another independent investigation into human rights abuses.47
Jacobo Timmerman
Throughout their reign, the Proceso faced widespread international criticism for its arrest
of journalists, activists, politicians, and others that spoke out against the Dirty War. American
human rights reporters documented these cases closely and created a better American
understanding of the difference between those victims and the leftist guerillas. For example, Tex
Harris reported on the difference between the peaceful socialist and communist political parties
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and the leftist guerillas.48 These arrests also brought more international attention to the Argentine
Dirty War as well as American involvement with the regime.
The highest profile of these arrests was that of journalist Jacobo Timerman, arrested in
April of 1977 and held for over a year without a trial. Timerman’s arrest eventually prompted
one of the largest direct confrontations between the United States and the Videla government
when Ambassador Castro publicly called upon Argentina to release Timerman.49 Timerman’s
arrest incited so much controversy not only because it disproved the idea that the Dirty War only
targeted terrorists, but also because the persecution of a Jewish journalist fueled the Nazi
imagery associated with the Videla government. Timerman later wrote a best-selling memoir on
his imprisonment that further incited public outrage as he described his captors’ open antiSemitism and display of Nazi imagery.50 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Timerman’s
charges were centered around a perceived connection with the Montoneros through his financial
dealings with the banker David Graiver, who was also incidentally involved with the western
financial sector’s expansion into Latin America up until his death in 1976.51 This connection
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with Gravier would also later spur rumors that Timerman was part of a financial terrorist cell.
Meanwhile, Timerman later became a vocal critic of American support for the Argentine regime
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.52 Such charges brought the connection between the Americans
and the supposedly Nazi government in Argentina to the forefront again. This was met with a
large response from the Carter administration who downplayed Timerman’s credibility in a
further attempt to maintain the Argentine-American relationship.53
Timerman’s account helped to fuel the already prevalent image of the Proceso as a group
of Nazi sympathizers, An image present in the international media as well as in the minds of
many Argentines. Andres Oppenheimer, in his article on Carter’s popularity in Argentina, states
that Argentines understood that Videla and other high ranking military officials were not Nazis.
However, many Argentines believed, perhaps correctly, that many rank and file soldiers in both
the Argentine armed forces and paramilitary groups such as the AAA held anti-Semitic beliefs
and displayed Nazi symbols and imagery.54 Timmerman’s description of antisemitic slurs and
Nazi imagery as something he encountered nearly every day during his imprisonment reinforced
the association between the Proceso and Nazism. This then placed the American relationship
with the Proceso into a much more negative light. Similar to Oppenheimer’s assertation, Jacobo
Timerman expressed similar sentiments by stating:
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“I was kidnapped by the extremist sector of the army. From the outset, President Rafael
Videla and General Roberto Viola tried to convert my disappearance into an arrest in
order to save my life. They did not succeed. My life was spared because this extremist
sector was also the heart of Nazi operations in Argentina. From the very first
interrogation, they figured they had found what they’d been looking for for so long: one
of the sages of Zion, a central axis of the Jewish anti-Argentine conspiracy.”55
Timerman’s account of his imprisonment reflected a grim reality that Videla, Viola, and others
that dealt with the United States did not have full control of the military. It would be natural to
conclude then that human rights changes were essentially impossible unless control was
consolidated. Despite this, the American-Argentine relationship was strong as ever by the time
Timmerman’s Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number was published. As will be
discussed later, the renewed American-Argentine relationship can be attributed to Cold War
strategic concerns. Although, the United States applauded the IAHRC’s very minimal
recognition that the Proceso was not a wholesale antisemitic regime.56
The 1978 World Cup in Buenos Aires
The decision to release Timerman in April of 1978 was influenced both by the mounting
American pressure and the approaching 1978 World Cup, which would be held in Argentina.
The tournament heightened American anxiety over human rights abuses as they feared that the
Videla government would increase its suppression of leftist guerillas to avoid terrorist attacks
during the tournament. This fear was at least partially reconciled by the Montoneros issuing a
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proclamation that they would place a partial moratorium on attacks in light of the World Cup.57
Still, the tournament was the subject of immense controversy as most media coverage centered
around the Dirty War. It was also made possible by the loans from the IMF and American banks
as the cost of holding the tournament were somewhere between $500-$700 million.58 This was a
tremendous expense for a nation that had forcibly stagnated wages for almost two years.
Furthermore, the 1978 World Cup was also a turning point for world football as the tournament
was becoming increasingly commercialized under the leadership of the ultra-corrupt Joao
Havelange, who aimed to essentially neoliberalize world football to fit in with the increasingly
globalized economy.59 The idealistic view of FIFA would be incredibly similar to the idealism of
the United States when it came to Argentina as both publicly argued that inclusion would
influence positive social change. For FIFA, this meant the continuation of the World Cup as
planned and the inclusion of the Argentine national team in international football. For the United
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States. this meant the liberalization of the Argentine economy and subsequent inclusion of
Argentina in the emerging globalized economy. In reality, FIFA hoped to profit from
Argentina’s deep footballing history just as the United States profited off Argentine
neoliberalization.60 Both saw human rights as a secondary concern at most. The Argentine
government also pinned a great deal of hope on the World Cup as a way to improve Argentina’s
international reputation and economy. The growth of 1976 and early 1977 had slowed
immensely by the summer of 1978, so Martínez de Hoz and others figured that the World Cup
would provide a necessary influx of capital. However, the actual revenue generated from the
tournament was considerably less than anticipated. 61
The World Cup’s impact on the public morale of Argentina and on Argentine-American
relations was similarly mixed. Scholars state that the Argentine victory in the World Cup was,
along with the initial invasion of the Falkland Islands, one of two moments of immense public
patriotism during the junta.62 However, the victory came in a highly contested overtime win that
has been largely tainted by the memory of the junta.63 The press coverage surrounding the World
Cup also brought in a large number of foreign journalists protected by international law. These
journalists then had more freedom to report on human rights abuses than any Argentine paper.
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The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo knew this and used it as an opportunity to protest in front of
an international audience. They began protesting more frequently and in larger numbers
following the disappearance of one of their members in May of 1978. The Dutch media gave
them the platform that they wanted by broadcasting their message to an international audience.64
This brought more attention to the Dirty War and American support for the Videla government.
The association between the United States and Argentina was also communicated directly during
the World cup by Henry Kissinger who fulfilled his promise to attend the tournament, much to
the chagrin of the Carter administration.65 Patricia Derian encouraged Cyrus Vance and others
connected to remind Kissinger that human lives were being lost, and he was reducing the impact
for a publicity stunt. 66 When Kissinger was interviewed by an Argentine newspaper in 1978, he
defined his position in a perhaps sarcastic and perhaps self-saving manner by stating: “I’m
supposed to be an expert in international affairs, but I hadn’t been in touch with what’s been
happening in Argentina in the last 10 years.”67
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The Beginning Descent Back down the Human Rights Hill
In a later interview, Derian described the challenges of walking in Kissinger’s footsteps
when it came to enacting human rights based foreign policy. Kissinger had institutionalized a
realist approach to foreign policy that overlooked human rights abuses to focus on the value that
nations, like Argentina, could offer the United States.68 Derian and others then encountered
significant resistance from those who still shared Kissinger’s view of foreign policy. Derian
discussed how the ARA and others remained sympathetic to the Argentines despite the human
rights abuses. She stated that they communicated the long-held argument that the junta had to do
what it had to do to control its terrorist problem.69 These reservations and other actions of
continued support, such as Kissinger’s attendance, demonstrated both a lack of synchronicity
amongst the architects of American foreign policy and the practical limits of the human rights
based foreign policy. The natural conclusion is that a human rights based foreign policy was not
conducive with the continuation of the American empire. The Carter administration was hoping
to create a moral empire where it could use its imperial influence to bring about positive human
rights changes. However, this goal was undermined by the attempt to preserve and expand
American economic influence in Argentina.
Many historians consider the visit of IACHR in 1979 to be the peak of the Carter human
rights initiative in Argentina as the Carter administration had made the approval of a $270
million contract for a factory in Argentina subject to the Proceso allowing another outside
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investigation of human rights. This time, the investigation was conducted by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the OAS’s human rights apparatus.70 Similar to the earlier
Amnesty International report, the IACHR report painted a bleak picture of the human rights
situation in Argentina. The report echoed many of Derian’s observations, especially
investigations into violations of rights of speech, labor, and religion.71 The IACHR report
concluded that:
In light of the background information and the considerations set forth in the present
report, the Commission has reached the conclusion that, due to the actions or the failure
to act on the part of the governmental authorities and their agents, numerous serious
violations of fundamental human rights, as recognized in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, were committed in the Republic of Argentina during the
period covered by this report – 1975 to 1979.72
Still, the United States responded to the report with disinterest or approval despite their initial
push for the investigation in the first place.
There are two key reasons for this. First, the public controversy around the Argentina had
mostly shifted towards allegations of anti-Semitism after Timmerman’s imprisonment. The
report absolved the military leadership of anti-Semitism, but only in the lightest possible way by
shifting blame to right wing paramilitary groups rather than the government of Argentina:
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“The Commission feels that the anti-Semitism that has broken out on a number of
occasions in Argentina comes from fanatical groups that are outside the Government’s
responsibility; however, the Government has the duty to implement a policy in
accordance with international juridical instruments on this subject”73
This, of course, does not account for the support that the government gave to these groups.
However, the report’s dismissal was satisfactory to the United States much to the chagrin of
Patricia Derian and others who had fought the human rights crusade directly.74 The second
reason then is that Carter was less willing to risk a falling out with Argentina after the Iranian
Revolution, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, and the revolution in Nicaragua in
1979.75
Political scientists have made much of Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy transformation
beginning in 1979 as he went from a human rights-based approach to a Cold War hard liner
during his tenure in office. One scholar, Robert Alexander Kraig, argues that Carter came into
office as an idealist that hoped to abandon the traditional approach to foreign policy in favor of
one that promoted human rights and morality. However, the reality of implementing this foreign
policy along with the historical developments that occurred during his presidency forced him to
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return to a realist foreign policy that prioritized Cold War strategy.76 As a profoundly anticommunist regime and regional power in Latin America, Argentina had an important place in
this strategy. However, it was hardly the ideal partner. While Argentina cooperated with
Operation Condor and other American military actions in Latin America and adhered to
American security doctrines, the Proceso did not fully act as a member of the American world
order. This is evident in Argentina’s unwillingness to abandon their friendly relationship with the
Soviet Union and Cuba. While scholars are divided on Argentina’s place in the Non-Aligned
movement, the American-Argentine relationship stayed mostly strong despite Argentina’s
ongoing relationships with communist countries.77
The relationship with the Soviet Union did cause the Carter administration a bit of
anxiety especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In a meeting with American
diplomats shortly after the grain embargo was announced, Jose Martínez de Hoz stressed that
grain embargos placed a larger stress on the Argentine economy as it was a large agricultural
exporter. Meanwhile, the United States hoped that Argentina would continue to abide by
American interests as Martínez de Hoz assured the State Department that Argentina condemned
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the Soviet invasion.78 As Argentina expressed the cost of the agricultural embargo, the United
States attempted to place pressure upon Argentina such as attempting to persuade European and
Asian allies to demonstrate that the Argentine decision to continue trading with the Soviets
would have consequences beyond just American-Argentine relations.79 Meanwhile, the
Americans observed that the Soviet Union was actively trying to gain influence in Argentina and
Latin America as a whole.80 The Soviet Union also increased its grain imports from Argentina
exponentially to compensate for loses caused by the American embargo. However, the
Argentines denied Soviet arms sales despite continued restrictions on American military aid and
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sales.81 Despite these attempts by the United States, Soviet-Argentine relations remained
normalized much to the chagrin of the United States.82
The IACHR report discussed the Proceso’s repeated violations of Argentine labor law
citing the junta’s restrictions on labor strikes, the forced disbanding of the majority of labor
unions, and the criminalization of labor activism. The IACHR report also documented the forced
imprisonment of labor leaders, in which they were denied trial or disappeared completely.
Additionally, the IACHR report discussed the arrest of labor leaders and activists in anticipation
of large strikes in April and May 1979.83 The treatment of organized labor by the Proceso was
indicative of its neoliberal economic ideology that depended upon the deregulation of labor and
the disbandment of labor unions. The report even mentions this ideology by citing the concerns
of many working-class Argentines that they have paid the price for the Proceso’s economic
programs.84 When describing the model of a neoliberal state David Harvey states that:
“Authoritarianism in market enforcement sits uneasily with ideals of individual freedoms.
The more neoliberalism veers towards the former, the harder it becomes to maintain its
legitimacy with respect to the latter and the more it has to reveal its anti-democratic
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colours. This contradiction is paralleled by a growing lack of symmetry in the power
relation between corporations and individuals...”85
In authoritarian regimes, such as existed in Argentina, this contrast between individual and
corporate freedom is sharper as market freedom is about all the freedom that existed. The
IAHRC’s reports then prove that the market freedom responsible for the early economic success
of the Proceso essentially only existed for foreign interests and the top earners.
Neoliberalism: Both Argentine and American
However, as confrontations on human rights mounted—the Argentine economic miracle
of 1976 began to crumble and the center of power within the junta began to move. The continued
economic decline in the fall of 1978 prompted a further deregulation of the Argentine finance
system with a series of banking reforms. These banking reforms were followed by another influx
of foreign investment capital. The relationship between American capital and the Argentine
economy went further as Robert Hill, the US Ambassador under Ford and Carter, became a
liaison for the Banco de Intercambio Regional. This appointment represented another
entanglement between the American government and the Argentine junta as several key
members of the junta had shares in the BIR.86 The BIR under José Rafael Trozzo also began
planning for the establishment of a branch in the United States to attract American capital
further.87 By 1979, the BIR had a branch in New York and was working to establish another in
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Washington DC; by 1980, the bank would be out of business. This was but one of the numerous
examples of the relationship between American capital, Argentine banks, and the American
government. However, the BIR was also a case study for the detriments of deregulation as the
bank ended up holding around 270 Billion Pesos in defaulted loans by March of 1980 and
became one of many Argentine banks to collapse that year.88
In Argentina, blame was resoundingly falling upon Martínez de Hoz and his economic
policies. Naturally, leftists and Argentine nationalists accused Martínez de Hoz and the Proceso
of catering to foreign business interests and allowing Argentine industry to fail. There were,
however, also charges that Martínez de Hoz’s policies had not been neoliberal enough. Some
Argentine scholars alleged that there needed to be further privatization and more austerity
measures. They argued that the military’s spending made it impossible for Martínez de Hoz’s
plan to tie the peso to the dollar to succeed.89 Lack of faith in Martínez de Hoz’s economic
policies quickly transferred to a lack of faith in Jorge Rafael Videla’s leadership as well, and the
two would be removed soon after Carter left office. The IAHRC report’s mention of the growing
dissatisfaction in the labor movement also materialized further. Despite the Proceso’s best
efforts, organized labor still maintained a position of relative strength as was discussed at the
end of the IAHRC report.90 Economic historian Paul H. Lewis concludes that by 1980, Argentine
unions were undoubtedly weakened but not defeated.91“Argentina, at the opening of the 1980s,
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was still locked in a class struggle that proved to be Peron’s most lasting legacy to the country,”
writes Lewis.92 The lack of stability and continuing disillusionment with the Proceso would lead
to Videla’s replacement by a series of brief successors until democratization in 1983.
Scholars have typically thought that the American turn towards neoliberalism came
during the Reagan administration and the implementation of “Reaganomics.” In his seminal
intellectual and practical history of neoliberalism, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman,
and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, Daniel Steadman contends that it was actually Carter who
began the American neoliberalization.93 Facing economic issues of inflation and stagnating
wages similar to those in Argentina, Carter similarly adopted neoliberal solutions rooted in the
doctrine of Milton Friedman and others. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), who had a strong
human rights- record, nevertheless agreed with Carter and became his more prudent ally on
economic reform in congress.94 The response from neoliberal fundamentalists in America was
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similar to that of Argentine neoliberals, the criticism was that Carter’s reforms were essentially
on the right path but not enough to bring about real change.95 Still, Carter’s deregulation of the
financial markets and appointment of Paul Volcker to head the Federal Reserve exemplified a
sea change in American political economic policy.96 Carter at one point proclaimed that “the
government could no longer solve people’s problems.” This proclamation and Carter’s turn to
neoliberalism placed the market at the center of all American policy for the next almost 30
years.97
Carter and Kennedy’s neoliberal turn demonstrates the further integration of human
rights and the promotion of neoliberal economics. As has been demonstrated, the Carter
administration ultimately pulled back its human rights initiative in order to preserve its strategic
and economic relationship with the Argentine military government. However, the Argentine
promotion of neoliberal economics was a consistent source of praise from the United States. The
re-emergence of human rights based foreign policy and the emergence of neoliberalism in the
late 1970s was not a coincidence. Neoliberalism promoted economic and consumer freedom
which theoretically allowed for democratic economic action even in authoritarian states such as
Argentina. Meanwhile, the United States could use its control of international trade and hefty
influence in the international finance system to award those who produced even marginal
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positive developments in human rights. Meanwhile, its sanctions and aid restrictions could be
proof of American promotion for human rights.98
Conclusion
Despite what was to come and the three past years of strained relations, AmericanArgentine relations were strong for the last few months of the Carter administration. There
remained confrontations on issues such as the Argentine support for the coup in Bolivia and
Argentine threats of leaving the OAS after the publishing of the IAHRC report.99 Still the
Argentines were willing to comply with American directions to avoid public declarations of
support for the Bolivian government of Garcia Meza.100 Additionally, the United States came to
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understand the Argentine security concerns in Bolivia and tensions subsided. American support
was fully realized with the visit of General Andrew Jackson Goodpaster later that year.101 This
renewed support demonstrates the persistence of the imperial nature of American foreign policy
despite the efforts to adopt a more idealistic vision. The choice between using American
influence to create a more moral world and the continuation of American imperialism had been
made. Repealing the human rights initiative allowed the United States continue to profit from of
Argentine neoliberalization and incorporate the Proceso into American Cold War strategy for
Latin America.
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Chapter 3: Embrace and Collapse under Ronald Reagan
Argentine-American relations during the administration of Ronald Reagan were
characterized by the continued embrace of the Proceso, condemnation of the Argentine invasion
of the Falklands, and then support for Argentina’s dramatic turn toward democratization. During
the final years of the dictatorship, the Reagan administration mostly turned back the human
rights initiatives that the Carter administration tried to champion and continued the
renormalization of relations that had been begun at the tail end of the Carter regime. The Reagan
administration was undoubtedly pleased by the neoliberal experiment in Argentina as they
continued to implement those same policies domestically much as Carter had in his final years in
office. Reagan’s focus on the Cold War led to cooperation with the anticommunist Proceso on
new military action in Central America. However, in 1982, Argentina’s decision to invade the
Falklands forced the Americans to reconcile their support for both the British and the Argentines.
The American position on the Falklands not only sunk the Argentine war effort but also
reaffirmed Argentina’s place as a subject power in the American world view. Still, American
support for Argentine neoliberalism continued to influence the nation’s history after
democratization in 1983.
Ronald Reagan’s Cold War Agenda
Discussing the American policy towards right wing dictatorships, Patricia Derian saw
similarities in the mindsets between Henry Kissinger and Jeane Kirkpatrick, one of Reagan’s key
foreign policy advisors and eventual ambassador to the UN; both Kissinger and Kirkpatrick
viewed these right-wing dictators as necessary to the implementation of American foreign policy
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goals.1 Derian’s veiled resentment is understandable as Reagan and Kirkpatrick both made
repeated public attacks on her human rights based foreign policy as harmful to the creation of
lasting alliances in the third world. Both Reagan and Kirkpatrick echoed another of Kissinger’s
talking points with their argument that the United States needed to be sympathetic to the
particular position of third world authoritarian governments.2 Kirkpatrick argued that foreign
policy influenced by morality and idealism was detrimental to the growth of American “power.”
Regarding dictators, she argued that right wing authoritarians believed in the same core values as
western nations, and their presence left open the possibility of democratization, while communist
governments actively rejected that possibility.3 Kirkpatrick was not only one of Reagan’s leading
advisors on Latin America, but she was also one of the few who continued to actively support
Argentina during the Falklands.4 Therefore, Kirkpatrick’s stance can be seen as a model of the
initial view point of the Reagan administration from which Reagan and many of his key advisors
strayed after placing blame for the conflict in the Falklands on the Argentines.
The Reagan administration’s initial support was based much more on Cold War strategy
than under any of the previous presidents. Reagan saw the Argentines as valuable allies in the
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developing conflicts in Central America, most notably the revolutions and civil wars in Central
American nations such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. Reagan and the Proceso shared an interest
in maintaining the dictatorships throughout Latin America. For Reagan, these dictatorships
depended upon American support, thus they became important supporters of Reagan’s new
regional initiatives. For the Proceso, these dictatorships were a part of the regional coalition
against the advancement of a regional leftist or democratic movement. The fall of Anastasio
Somoza, the American backed dictator in Nicaragua, triggered a shared reactionary impulse to
reconsolidate regional power around the right-wing authoritarian governments. Similarly,
Bolivia in 1981 was an example of open Argentine intervention. The explanation given by the
Argentines was that the election of Hernan Siles Zuazo posed a clear threat to the governments
of Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina itself.5 However, the Argentines differed from the traditional
model of a Cold War authoritarian state as leadership became unclear and began quickly shifting
shortly after Carter took office in 1981.
The Reagan administration’s focus on Cold War strategy over human rights can be
identified further by its push for the repeal of the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment. The repeal
of the Kennedy-Humphrey Amendment in December of 1981 was the last nail in the coffin for
Carter’s human rights initiative as it ended the restrictions placed on military aid to Argentina
since 1978. The Reagan administration reiterated the IAHRC report’s conclusion that the
Proceso was not an explicitly anti-Semitic regime.6 Meanwhile, the Proceso further revealed its
strategic value to the United States’ goals in Central America. After the fall of Somoza in 1979,
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the Argentine junta began arming the pro-Somoza forces that would eventually become the
“Contras.” In 1981, the CIA then began arming and supporting these forces as well. The
Argentine support then played into a broader strategy as Reagan hoped to use the Contras to
counter guerillas in El Salvador as well.7 1981 also saw the formalization of the American
involvement in this operation as the Argentines became the trainers of groups funded by the
United States through the CIA.8 The United States depended on Argentina as a surrogate to fight
the spread of communism in Central America, and the Argentines complied as they saw the
defeat of communism in Central America as a matter of their own national security.9
However, the Argentines were not fully under the thumb of American imperial control as
they continued to maintain relations with both the Cubans and Soviets throughout Reagan’s
tenure in office.10 This complication is best seen in Argentina’s economic ties to the Soviet
Union as the stagnating Argentine economy was boosted by Soviet purchases of Argentine
agricultural exports during the American embargo. Furthermore, the Soviets supplied the
Argentine Proceso with economic support for the construction of hydroelectric dams and other
infrastructure projects similar to those funded by the IDB and other American influenced
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organizations.11 The Soviet relationship had been a point of contention since the Carter
administration tried to recruit the Proceso for its grain embargo. American conservatives
criticized the emphasis that the Reagan administration placed on American-Argentine relations
and alleged that Argentina and the United States did not share the same goals. In a New York
Times op-ed, Thomas D. Anderson, alleged that Argentina offered little to nothing of value to the
United States. Citing the realist foreign policy that dominated the Reagan administration’s view
of the world, Anderson alleged that the Argentine authoritarian government did not necessitate
the same support as similar regimes in South Korea or Pakistan.12
Further Neoliberal Entrenchment in Argentina and the United States
Jorge Rafael Videla, and in effect Martínez de Hoz as well, were replaced in March of
1981 by General Roberto Viola as president and Lorenzo Sigaut at the head of the economic
policy team. Viola and Sigaut set about restoring stability to the Argentine economy as that had
been the initial promise of the Proceso in 1976. Sigaut returned to the protectionist economic
policies of previous generations and partially reversed the neoliberalization of Martínez de Hoz.
This caused a collapse of both domestic and foreign investment that amounted to $30 billion
leaving Argentina between 1979 and 1982 with the peak in 1981. Similarly, the economic panic
caused many Argentines to place their confidence in the stability of the American economy with
the buying of dollars.13 The Viola government quickly began devaluating the peso as well with
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forced devaluations coming in April and June of 1981.14 This new economic plan did not save
the Argentines from their debt problem either as the government’s attempts to restructure the
economy were costly. The need for more funds brought the Proceso back to western financial
institutions as the Argentines searched for the money needed to maintain economic stability.
Bank of America and a coalition of 77 other American and international banks granted the
Proceso a $600 million loan in the summer of 1981.15 These additional loans were added onto an
already hefty national debt that ultimately totaled $32 billion by the end of 1981.16 By December
of 1981, Viola would be replaced with Leopoldo Galtieri. Galtieri would then remove Sigaut and
begin a return to neoliberalization with promises of privatization and free market economic
policy.17
In December of 1981, the Galtieri government in Argentina began further
neoliberalization of the Argentine economy with the hope of reversing the nation’s economic
fortunes. For the first time since 1975, Argentina even reduced its defense budget. However, the
prospects for the Argentine economy and the Proceso itself were sealed less than 6 months into
the Galtieri government when Argentina invaded the Falklands. The conflict crashed the
economy further with inflation and foreign debt peaking while industrial production
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plummeted.18 Meanwhile, the United States’ decision to back Great Britain was not only
disastrous to the Argentine war effort but also to the Argentine economy as the United States put
strict sanctions on the Argentines in retaliation for the invasion.19
Ronald Reagan may be the most well-known American neoliberal; indeed, his economic
policies, popularly known as Reaganomics, appear almost a synonym for neoliberalism in the
popular American discourse. In Masters of the Universe, Daniel Steadman Jones argues that
Ronald Reagan came into office hoping to implement four neoliberal economic policies: tighter
monetary policy, increased deregulation and market liberalization in most sectors of the
economy, tax cuts, and sharp cuts in federal spending.20 Meanwhile, Reagan further stressed his
support for Milton Friedman’s particular brand of neoliberal economics by giving Freidman a
position within the administration.21 Latin American nations institutionalized Friedman’s
doctrine through the appointment of Chicago adjacent economists, but the United States made
Friedman a part of their institution. Months into his presidency, Reagan emulated the anti-labor
policy of the Proceso by breaking up a series of air traffic controller strikes and firing almost
12,000 workers in August of 1981.22 Reagan followed this up with a series of tax cuts for
America’s wealthiest and justified it by arguing that lifting the burden on industry leaders would
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benefit all Americans.23 The Proceso had used similar logic and sentiment in its earliest public
addresses and, again similar to what happened in the United States, only the wealthiest gained
any benefit. The Proceso promised victories over poverty and political uncertainty; and yet,
ultimately worsened both. 24
The Falklands War
By 1982, the Proceso’s support among nearly every sector of Argentina was eroding and,
although its relationship with the United States was secure due to its cooperation in Central
America; the United States was concerned over the stability of the Argentine government after
Videla left power. The decision to invade the Falklands was then the nail in the coffin for the
already doomed Proceso. However, the invasion was directly aimed at attempting to salvage this
support as David Sheinin describes the invasion of the Falklands as only the second instance
where the Proceso had enthusiastic patriotic support; with the other being the 1978 World Cup
victory discussed previously.25
The Proceso had been vocal about its desire to eventually annex the islands since their
inception in 1976. They even mentioned it in the infamous Santiago meeting with Kissinger in
the summer of that year. Kissinger did his best to move past the issue and focus upon the agreed
upon shared interests of the United States and Argentina, but the islands remained an unresolved
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dispute.26 In 1979, the United States conducted an overview of the Falklands issue and concluded
that Argentina may one day gain jurisdiction over the islands—but determined that ultimately the
United States was unconcerned with the islands’ governance as long as they did not fall into
unfriendly hands.27 By 1981, the British had begun talks with the Argentine government about
possibly granting sovereignty of the islands to the Argentines on a limited basis; however, they
also concluded that the majority of the islands’ permanent residents were farmers that did not
care to become a part of Argentina. Still, the British and Americans were content to let the issue
eventually pass.28 By January of 1982, the United States felt that Argentine interest in the
Falklands had dissipated as they were becoming increasingly concerned with domestic economic
and political issues. This was compounded by the Argentine decision to postpone their scheduled
talks with the United Kingdom by almost a year.29
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The invasion in April of 1982 then came as a bit of a surprise to the United States. In
initial debates about US reaction, Kirkpatrick emerged one of the few to champion a degree of
sympathy for the Argentine cause. The majority of Reagan’s key advisors sympathized with the
British out of both loyalty to the European and UN ally and in deference to Reagan’s personal
connection to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The United States then issued demands
for a ceasefire and negotiations over the islands to communicate their pro-British neutrality.30 As
the Americans awaited the British response to the invasion, they went to the OAS to attempt to
garner some support for neutrality. However, the OAS voted that Argentina held domain over the
islands. Despite this, the United States broke from the OAS’s ruling and continued to support the
British by issuing the previously mentioned sanctions in late April of 1982.31 American support
for the British ended Argentine cooperation in American backed campaigns in Central America,
and there was a period of strong anti-American sentiment in Argentina.32 The conflict was over
by June of 1982 and the Argentine forces had been pushed off the islands and embarrassed both
by the British armed forces and their expectation of American support.
In 1983, W. Michael Reisman, a legal scholar, analyzed the Falklands conflict within the
frame of “Contemporary International Norms” or the concepts of self-determination and
decolonization. They argued that the United Kingdom, and the United States to a lesser extent,
based claims on the Falkland Islands on the right of the Islanders to choose their nation. He
stated then that: “This played well in the United States, but is less persuasive when examined
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carefully, since the preeminence of self-determination over decolonization in a case like the
Falklands is far from clear.”33 Reisman instead argued that self-determination in colonial
contexts needs to consider a broader spectrum of considerations as the will of the inhabitants of
the Falkland Islands was not backed by a substantial self-reliant society.34 Reisman went on to
discuss how the Argentine government had a legal basis to their claims that was again backed by
most of their Latin American allies—but since the United States and the United Kingdom
presented them as the aggressors, they were treated as such.35 The purpose of introducing
Reisman’s argument is that it serves to illustrate how the existing contrast between the developed
and developing world influenced the American response. The United States sided with the
British because the United Kingdom was the more powerful ally with positions of power in
NATO and the UN. This decision then further developed the American-Argentine relationship as
one that could never be truly equal with the Argentines always falling below the Americans in
both their own mind and the international order.
Debt and Democracy: the Proceso’s Final Months and Legacy
As Argentina was preoccupied with the fallout from the Falklands war, the Latin
American economy almost completely collapsed in the summer of 1982. While this triggered a
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turn to neoliberalism for the rest of the region, Argentina was not in a position to take part.36
After being defeated in the Falklands, the Proceso began the process of democratization.
Reynaldo Bignone, a former general, took charge of a new “caretaker” government and
scheduled elections to take place in 1983. With no confidence in the Argentine economy,
Bignone’s administration mostly tried to minimize damage rather than continuing the neoliberal
transformation of his predecessors. Meanwhile, the Argentine people saw inflation and prices
skyrocket to the point that cost of living increased by 400 percent annually between 1982 and
1983.37
Following the defeat in the Falklands, future president Raúl Alfonsín stated, “"The
Armed forces do not deserve this destiny, and the people do not deserve this government. A
civilian transition to democratic rule must now begin."38 Alfonsín ultimately oversaw this
transformation and came to power as the first democratically elected leader since Isabelle Peron
had been deposed almost a decade prior. As a Radical, Alfonsín appealed to many Argentines as
a break from both Peronism and military rule. Once in power, Alfonsín set about bringing the
Proceso to trial for its crimes during the Dirty War. He rejected the military’s calls for general
amnesty, set up a civilian judicial commission, and ultimately arrested many of the highestranking members of the Proceso. Although, Alfonsín’s administration passed legislation that
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limited the responsibility of individual soldiers and only prosecuted the highest-ranking officers
despite massive public protests, the trials themselves became a moment in the history of
Argentina as the Proceso’s crimes were fully exposed before the general public.39 American
media closely followed the trials. Patricia Derian’s testimony was particularly damning as she
detailed an Argentine admiral’s thinly veiled threats when confronted about torture.40 These
trials exposed the violence of the Dirty War to the world and the gruesome reality of what was
previously only assumed by both the Argentine and American public. In his treatise on violence,
the philosopher Slavoj Zizek argues that the traumatic and gruesome details of violence are what
makes it appear real.41 This is essentially what happened with these trials. The New York Times
even presented the trials as the first of their kind and a milestone with regards to justice for Latin
American authoritarians.42 However, American complacency for the Dirty War was not
discussed. Instead, the narrative was that democracy brought justice to a faraway dictatorship.
Although these trials would result in Videla and others being sentenced to life imprisonment,
most of those arrested would have their sentences commuted by Alfonsín’s successor, Carlos
Menem.43
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American-Argentine relations under Alfonsín and Ronald Reagan were friendly but not
to the level that they were prior to democratization. Most notably, Alfonsín condemned Reagan’s
intervention in Central America and took a renewed interest in placing Argentina into the
nonaligned or third world international contingent.44 Moreover, Alfonsín moved away from
neoliberal reforms inverse to Reagan’s continued neoliberalization. Ideologically, Alfonsín was
opposed to foreign capital’s influence within Argentina and supported suspending payments to
Argentina’s western creditors.45 Alfonsín also inherited a much worse economic situation than
even existed before the military government. The foreign debts assumed by the Proceso to
support their neoliberal economic structuring totaled over $46 billion by 1983.46 Although
Alfonsín may have ideologically supported an anti-imperialist economic policy that defied
Argentina’s foreign debts, he understood that actually applying this policy would alienate
Argentina internationally. Alfonsín thus continued to pay Argentina’s debts while attempting to
enact economic change that were ultimately, as Paul H. Lewis argues, inconsequential and did
little to reverse the Argentine economic fortunes.47
Carlos Menem, on the other hand, was a devoted neoliberal and a self-described Peronist.
With rhetoric, similar to that employed by the early Proceso, promising to usher in a new era for
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Argentina, Carlos Menem was able to win the Argentine presidency in 1989.48 Menem then fully
embraced both the United States and neoliberalism, as was defined by emerging Washington
Consensus.49 Furthermore, Carlos Menem was more than willing to cooperate with American
regional economic goals. He adhered to the neoliberal economic agenda pushed by the IMF and
the United States, he pushed privatization and further deregulation, and he again appointed
Chicago school neoliberals to direct economic policy.50 Menem seemed to be the American ideal
of an Argentine leader. He enacted neoliberal policies to a larger extent than the Proceso ever
had without any of the human rights abuses. He had even served two sentences as a political
prisoner under the Argentine military government from 1978-1981.51 However, this ideal state
deteriorated quickly after a sharp economic collapse in the early 2000s.52
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Carlos Menem‘s economic policy was hardly unique and was rooted in the emerging
Washington Consensus that was spreading rapidly throughout much of Latin America by the
1990s.53 Under Ronald Reagan, the American influenced international finance systems establish
a set of standards for the ideal economic policies of debtor nations. This set of standards mostly
consisted of neoliberal reforms that pushed for deregulation, prioritized an end to protectionism,
and encouraged full participation in the global economy just as the economic policies idealized
by Jose Martínez de Hoz in Argentina had.54 The Latin American nations that adopted the
neoliberal reforms pushed by the Washington Consensus were attempting to confront the same
issues that the Proceso had including massive inflation, economic recession, and debt.55
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statist development model (The authors are referring to the import-substitution policies that
dominated Latin American economics prior to the neoliberal revolution). With the support of
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However, there are several key differences between American relations with Washington
Consensus nations and their relationship with the Argentine military dictatorship.
First, the Proceso was influenced by American economic ideology, but the Argentine
military government was not pushed to neoliberalize their economy by the American
government. Instead, they adopted neoliberal reforms in an attempt to stabilize and modernize
their economy. The influence of American economists cannot be denied as Adolfo Díz was
educated in the economics department of the University of Chicago 56 Meanwhile, as has been
argued, the United States responded to neoliberalization positively and thus it became an
important tenet of American-Argentine relations as it was routinely rewarded with new loans or
continued support despite the nation’s human rights abuses. The economic connections made
through American investment then also restricted human rights initiatives.
Second, the Proceso neoliberalized the Argentine economy as much as it could while
maintaining its position of power in Argentina. However, its need for immense spending on
defense restricted its ability to neoliberalize the Argentine economy. The Proceso was also
reluctant to privatize many of the state-owned enterprises that provided them with a great deal of
wealth and international leverage.57 When comparing the application of neoliberal economic
policies in Argentina and Chile, one scholar stated: “However, Argentine economic policy is
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comparable to the Chilean only with certain reservations. Although Martínez de Hoz, the
Minister of Economic Affairs, had since March 1976 pursued a course which exhibits extensive
similarity to that of neighbouring Chile, the Argentine politicians from the very start have not
acted nearly as consistently or rigorously as their Chilean colleagues.”58 The consistency
discussed here was only damaged further by chaotic leadership changes within the Argentine
military government during the early 1980s.
Without the restraints of the military government, the Carlos Menem administration was
able to fully embrace the Washington Consensus and commence a series of neoliberal reforms
much more radical than those enacted during the Proceso’s tenure in power. Menem’s
neoliberalization, most notably his support for the Brady Plan, were rewarded as he received a
new series of loans including a $150 million form the World Bank.59 Menem demonstrated his
break from the limits of the neoliberal military government by privatizing many of Argentina’s
state-owned companies.60 The economic collapse and fallout in the early 2000s then ensured that
the Menem administration would be remembered as the most neoliberal state in Argentine
history.61
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that international debt is also remembered more as a legacy of the Menem administration than as
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Conclusion
Naturally, and perhaps rightfully, the Dirty War is the most profound legacy of the
Proceso de Reorganización Nacional. However, the history of Argentine neoliberalism is forever
entwined with the Dirty War as is evidenced by American-Argentine relations during the first
year of the Ronald Reagan administration when the United States was as complacent towards the
human rights abuses of the Dirty War as they were supportive of Argentine neoliberal policies
and cooperation in American Cold War strategy. American-Argentine relations were greatly
damaged by the Falklands War and remained strained during the Alfonsín administration.
Moreover, the institutionalization of the Washington Consensus then represents a formal
recognition of neoliberalization as a tenant of American foreign policy. A development that was
predated by American-Argentine relations during the period of military governance.

a part of the Proceso’s legacy as he makes scant mention of the pre-1989 relationship between
Argentina and international lenders.
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Concluding Remarks
For the United States, neoliberalism was a method of expanding its neocolonial influence
into Argentina. Although the philosophy promoted market liberalization and a decrease in
spending, Argentine neoliberalization required immense foreign loans to get off the ground.
These loans through organizations such as the IMF gave the United States a great deal of
influence to both expand American business and economic interests further into Argentina and to
promote neoliberalism despite the clear detriments. However, the Americans were both hesitant
to embrace the Argentine military government and generally apathetic towards the Southern
Cone of South America by the middle of the 1970s. It was not until the Argentines began
implementing neoliberal reforms and engaging in regional anti-communist interventions that the
Americans began supporting the Proceso. At that point, the initial economic success of
neoliberalization pushed the State Department to turn a blind eye to the Argentine human rights
abuses.
Neoliberalism not only offered the Argentine military government cover for their
rampant and brutal human rights abuses, but also initially offered immense financial benefits for
the Argentine upper classes from which the Proceso drew its support. Meanwhile, American
neoliberal thinkers could deny their accountability by arguing that market freedom would
ultimately lead to political freedom although, there is little evidence that the American
government bought into this belief. Instead, they were happy to encourage policies that allowed
for further entrenchment of American capital into the Argentine economy. All the while, the
Proceso’s profound opposition to communism satisfied the remaining contingent of cold warriors
in the American government. However, the Argentine military government’s Dirty War against
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the Montoneros, the ERP, and others caused a major backlash in the media, public, and within
Congress.
This backlash led the Carter administration to promote a human rights initiative that
promoted a vision of an American moral empire. However, the Carter administration and the
State Department were full of cold warriors and foreign policy realists that undermined this
initiative at every step. Again, there were limited successes in both promoting a positive image
of the United States and creating protections for activist groups. These successes happened in
spite of rather than because of the majority within the American government. By 1979, the
Carter administration completely abandoned the mantle of human rights and embraced a realist
foreign policy that fully supported the Argentine military government. This shift, brought on by a
series of events in Latin America and abroad, further cemented the human rights crusade as an
institutional failure. The Americans rationalized that the IAHRC report had cleared the
Argentine military government from allegations of rampant anti-Semitism. However, there were
still tens of thousands of Argentines missing that the United States chose to not pursue an answer
for.
By the time Ronald Reagan came into office, Argentina was in a sharp economic decline
as neoliberalism began to fail even the wealthiest Argentines. As Ronald Reagan turned his
concerns towards issues in Nicaragua and El Salvador, the Argentine military government again
appealed to the United States with its support for regional anti-communist intervention.
Meanwhile, Reagan began a full scale neoliberalization of the American economy with policies
mirroring those implemented in Argentina. With Argentina offering few economic prospects by
1982, the United States rejected the OAS’s calls to support Argentina and backed the United
Kingdom in the Falklands War. This not only doomed the Argentine military government, who
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held little to no support from the Argentina public, but also reiterated Argentina’s place as a
subject power within the American worldview.
The legacy of American support is one of nearly abject failure in Argentina. The
American endorsed neoliberalization left the Argentine economy in shambles by 1983. The loans
from American financial institutions that propped up the military government also left Argentina
in immense debt that shaped its economic future for the next 3 decades or longer. The Dirty War,
that the United States was largely apathetic towards, left over 8.000 Argentines still disappeared
by the late 1980s.1 The next, and perhaps more famous, Argentine neoliberal president Carlos
Menem made sure that the few who had been brought to justice for their crimes were freed. All
while, the United States has been able to distance themselves from the Argentine military
government and faced little continuing backlash for their complacency during the Dirty War.
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